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Abstract
This thesis investigates security in multi-agent systems for mobile communica-
tion. Mobile as well as non-mobile agent technology is addressed.
A general security analysis based on properties of agents and multi-agent sys-
tems is presented along with an overview of security measures applicable to
multi-agent systems, and in particular to mobile agent systems.
A security architecture, designed for deployment of agent technology in a mo-
bile communication environment, is presented. The security architecture allows
modelling of interactions at all levels within a mobile communication system.
This architecture is used as the basis for describing security services and mech-
anisms for a multi-agent system. It is shown how security mechanisms can be
used in an agent system, with emphasis on secure agent communication.
Mobile agents are vulnerable to attacks from the hosts on which they are ex-
ecuting. Two methods for dealing with threats posed by malicious hosts to a
trading agent are presented. The first approach uses a threshold scheme and
multiple mobile agents to minimise the effect of malicious hosts. The second
introduces trusted nodes into the infrastructure.
Undetachable signatures have been proposed as a way to limit the damage a
malicious host can do by misusing a signature key carried by a mobile agent.
This thesis proposes an alternative scheme based on conventional signatures and
public key certificates.
Threshold signatures can be used in a mobile agent scenario to spread the risk
between several agents and thereby overcome the threats posed by individual
malicious hosts. An alternative to threshold signatures, based on conventional
signatures, achieving comparable security guarantees with potential practical
advantages compared to a threshold scheme is proposed in this thesis.
Undetachable signatures and threshold signatures are both concepts applicable
to mobile agents. This thesis proposes a technique combining the two schemes
to achieve undetachable threshold signatures.
This thesis defines the concept of certificate translation, which allows an agent
to have one certificate translated into another format if so required, and thereby
save storage space as well as being able to cope with a certificate format not
foreseen at the time the agent was created.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Motivation and challenges
The concept of an agent originates from the area of Artificial Intelligence (AI)
but has now gained more widespread acceptance in mainstream computer sci-
ence [84]. The term ‘agent’ has become fashionable, and a more mature tech-
nology than currently available is often implied. This is in particular true for
security in multi-agent systems. Over-simplified assumptions and references to
security solutions that do not address all the issues are not uncommon in the
literature. Naturally, security is not a driving force for the research and devel-
opment of multi-agent systems, and therefore has not received much attention
from the agent community. Nevertheless, in order for agent technology to gain
widespread use and provide viable solutions for commercial applications, secu-
rity issues need to be addressed.
Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems represent a relatively new way of
analysing, designing, and implementing complex software systems. This thesis
is only concerned with the security of the system and its components (leav-
ing design methodologies to others). Several multi-agent systems are available
as commercial products and many more have been implemented in various re-
search projects, with varying success. Ongoing standardisation efforts [21, 48]
have proven successful and are still evolving. Today there is growing interest
and research in implementing and rolling out (open) multi-agent systems on a
wider scale1. Mobile VCE (www.mobilevce.com), which funded this research,
is undertaking one such project where the agent paradigm is researched in a
mobile telecommunications setting.
1See http://www.agentcities.org for an example of an ongoing effort to implement large
scale multi-agent systems.
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Agents are independent pieces of software capable of acting autonomously in
response to input from their environment. Agents can posses differing capabil-
ities [80], but typically possess the required functionality to fulfil their design
objectives. To be described as ‘intelligent’, software agents should also have
the ability to act autonomously, that is without direct human interaction, be
flexible, and in a multi-agent system be able to communicate with other agents,
that is to be social. Agents are, to various degrees, aware of their environment,
which can also often be affected by the agents’ actions.
A mobile agent is a particular class of agent with the ability during execution
to migrate from one host to another where it can resume its execution. It
has been suggested that mobile agent technology, amongst other things, can
help to reduce network traffic and to overcome network latencies [52]. The
limited processing resources and power supply available to many mobile devices
are also arguments for mobile agents. Mobile agents could migrate to hosts
with sufficient resources. An agent’s ability to move does, however, introduce
significant security problems.
Future mobile communication systems are envisioned as being able to offer a
much wider range of services [108], thereby putting new requirements on the
communication infrastructure. The software agent paradigm is believed to be
able to offer a number of important properties for applications as well as for
middleware services of future mobile communication systems [83]. It is within
this context that the research presented in this thesis has been pursued.
The system envisioned utilises agent technology. Agents can exist on all kinds
of hosts throughout the infrastructure, from the smallest devices (e.g. watch
or phone) to application servers and communication infrastructure equipment.
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While some agents will have the capability to move between platforms, others
will always reside on the same platform. Whichever is the case, agents need
access to certain security functionality. The envisioned system also includes,
and allows, devices not using agent technology.
The system will also need to cope with different kinds of information each of
which may require very different levels of protection. While certain information
needs extensive protection, other information might not. This must be kept in
mind when providing security services.
The system needs to be scalable. Security functionality can often be easily rolled
out and provided for a small system; however, to do so on larger scale and in
such a way that the system is allowed to grow requires robust solutions.
Openness in this context means that there is no single authority in control of
the system. This means that users and service providers are able to connect to
the infrastructure and utilise it in a similar way to the Internet today. Indeed,
the system is likely to utilise, and interact with, the Internet.
Flexibility, scalability, and openness are important properties for the envisioned
agent system [83]. One of the motivations for the use of the agent paradigm
is that it facilitates flexibility: self-contained agents can be deployed to work
autonomously in the system, with minimal management from the system itself.
Security services for a multi-agent system should be general enough to be used
as desired by the agents without imposing too high an overhead. Furthermore,
security functionality should not be implemented in such a way that it prohibits
the provision of additional security functionality, as may be required within
certain applications. Therefore security functionality needs to be provided in a
17
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manner that does not impede flexibility or extension.
1.2 Structure of thesis
This thesis is organised as follows. In the remainder of this chapter, the main
contributions of this thesis are first described, the notation and cryptographic
primitives used throughout the thesis are specified, and definitions of security
terminology used are given.
Chapter 2 describes properties of agents and multi-agent systems, focusing on is-
sues with possible security implications. Security issues for multi-agent systems
are then identified.
Chapter 3 describes available technologies and research efforts addressing se-
curity issues in multi-agent systems, with emphasis on technology addressing
issues for mobile agents.
In chapter 4 a security architecture for agent based mobile systems is proposed.
The architecture has four levels of abstraction: the involved parties, the device
structure, the agent execution environment, and the agent construction.
Chapter 5 describes security services and mechanisms for agent based mobile
systems, and relates these to the architecture proposed in chapter 4.
Chapter 6 describes how security of communication between agents on different
platforms can be addressed in general, as well as within the context of the
security model presented in chapter 4.
18
1. Introduction
Chapter 7 evaluates the FIPA standards for agent communication protocols and
outlines how security can be added to them.
In chapter 8 a ‘pragmatic’ alternative to undetachable signatures is proposed,
relying on the use of conventional signatures and public key certificates. Un-
detachable signatures let a user limit the intention of the data string to which
a correct signature can be applied. We show how this can be achieved using
conventional mechanisms.
Chapter 9 proposes two methods to improve the security and reliability of mobile
agent based transactions in an environment which may contain some malicious
hosts.
Chapter 10 presents alternatives to threshold signatures that raise questions
about the value of such schemes when applied in a mobile agent setting.
Chapter 11 introduces the concept of undetachable threshold signatures, which
enables constrained signing power to be distributed across multiple agents, thus
reducing the necessary trust in single agent platforms.
In chapter 12 the concept of certificate translation is defined and examples of
its applications are proposed.
Finally, chapter 13 gives the conclusions of this thesis.
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1.3 Contribution of thesis
A security analysis based on properties of agents and multi-agent systems is
presented (chapter 2). Security analyses have been carried out by others, but
usually with a particular application in mind, resulting in more narrow threat
scenarios compared to the security issues presented in this thesis. An overview
of the security measures applicable to multi-agent systems, and in particular to
mobile agent systems, is also given (chapter 3).
A security architecture, designed for deployment of agent technology in a mobile
communication environment, is presented in chapter 4. The security architec-
ture allows modelling of interactions at all levels within a mobile communication
system. This architecture is then used as a basis for describing security services
and mechanisms for a multi-agent system (chapter 5), with emphasis on secure
agent communication (chapter 6), where we show how security mechanisms can
be used in an agent system.
The FIPA agent communication protocols have become a de facto standard, but
lack security functionality. This is addressed in chapter 7 where we analyse the
FIPA specifications and outline how security can be added to them.
Undetachable signatures have been proposed [98] as a way to limit the damage
a malicious host can do by misusing a signature key carried by a mobile agent.
In chapter 8 we propose a scheme for the same purpose, relying on conventional
signatures and public key certificates.
Mobile agents are vulnerable to attacks from the hosts on which they are exe-
cuting. If a mobile agent is sent out to find a particular item of merchandise on
20
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a user’s behalf it is exposed to a range of possible attacks from the hosts visited
by the agent. In chapter 9 we propose two ways to overcome the threats posed
by malicious hosts. The first approach uses a threshold scheme and multiple
mobile agents to minimise the effect of malicious hosts. The second approach
introduces trusted nodes into the infrastructure.
Threshold signatures can be used in a mobile agent scenario to spread the risk
between several agents and thereby overcome the threats posed by individual
malicious hosts. In chapter 10 we propose a rather simple alternative to thresh-
old signatures based on conventional signatures, achieving comparable security
guarantees with potential practical advantages compared to a threshold scheme.
Undetachable signatures and threshold signatures are both concepts applicable
to mobile agents. In chapter 11 we propose a scheme combining the two schemes
to achieve undetachable threshold signatures.
Agents in a mobile communications environment are likely to be exposed to a
variety of applications requiring them to produce digital signatures, and supply
a digital certificate that can be used to validate the signature. Several different
formats for digital certificates exist today, usually optimised for a particular ap-
plication or environment. If an agent is exposed to several of these applications
or environments, it may need to have as many digital certificates. In chapter 12
we define the concept of certificate translation, which allows an agent to have
one certificate translated into another format if so required, and thereby save
storage space as well as being able to cope with a certificate format not foreseen
at the time the agent was created.
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1.4 Notation and cryptographic primitives
In this section we briefly describe some of the cryptographic tools used to pro-
vide security functionality, as well as the notation used throughout this thesis.
For a more thorough introduction to all the necessary cryptography see, for
example, [87].
Symmetric encryption
Symmetric encryption, or secret-key encryption, uses a secret key to encrypt
a message into ciphertext and the same key to decrypt the ciphertext into the
original message.
For the purposes of this thesis
EK(m)
denotes symmetric encryption of data string m using secret key K.
There are a number of available symmetric encryption algorithms (see, for ex-
ample, [87]).
Symmetric cryptography, which includes symmetric encryption and messages
authentication codes (see below), requires the sender and receiver to agree on a
shared secret key. Symmetric cryptography is in general more efficient in terms
of computing resources than asymmetric cryptography (defined below).
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Message authentication codes
Message Authentication Codes (MACs) aim to guarantee the source and in-
tegrity of a message. A MAC is sent together with the message it is protecting.
For the purposes of this thesis
MACK(X)
denotes a MAC computed on data X using the secret key K.
There are a variety of well-established means for computing MACs, typically
either based on the use of a block cipher or a cryptographic hash function (see,
for example, [87]). There are also standards for such schemes, notably ISO/IEC
9797 parts 1 and 2 [72, 73].
Asymmetric cryptography
Asymmetric cryptography, or public-key cryptography, involves the use of two
distinct keys, one public and one private. The private key is kept secret by
its owner, while the public key can be freely shared with everyone. There are
a number of different types of asymmetric cryptographic schemes, including
encryption schemes and digital signatures.
Whilst asymmetric cryptography does not, like symmetric cryptography, rely on
the sender and receiver agreeing on a shared secret, the user of the public key
must ensure that the correct key is used. Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs) are
used for this purpose. In a PKI, Certification Authorities (CAs) issue digitally
signed certificates which bind a public key to an identity and possibly other in-
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formation (e.g. certificate expiry date). X.509 [76] is a widely adopted standard
specifying the format of digital certificates. Standards also exists for PKIs, see
for example IETF PKIX2.
Asymmetric encryption
In an asymmetric encryption scheme, the public key is used for encryption and
the private key for decryption. The most commonly used algorithm for public-
key encryption is RSA (see for example [87]). Standards describing how to use
asymmetric encryption include [59].
For the purposes of this thesis
EX(m)
denotes the asymmetric encryption of data string m using the public key of
entity X.
Digital signatures
Digital signatures aim at guaranteeing the origin and integrity of a message.
The originator of a message uses his signing key, the private key, to sign the
message and sends it along with the message to the recipient. The recipient
uses the verification key, i.e. the public key of the signer, to verify the origin
and integrity of the message. Typically a digital signature functions as a check
value on data, and we assume the use of such a signature scheme throughout
this thesis. That is, when sending a digital signature on data, both the data
and the signature need to be transmitted. Signature schemes do exist where
2 http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/pkix-charter.html
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part or all of the data can be recovered from the signature itself, but these are
less commonly used.
For the purposes of this thesis
sX(m)
denotes the signature of entity X (which must be computed using the private
signature key of X) on data string m.
There are many signature schemes available (see for example [87]), including
a number of techniques which are international standards, see for example,
[45, 59, 66, 67, 68].
1.5 Definitions
In this section security terminology used in the reminder of this thesis is defined.
This is by no means intended to be a complete list of security terminology. (For
further information and discussions of security terminology see, for example,
[47, 49, 69].)
Access control: The means of enforcing authorisation [47].
(Entity) Authentication: The provision of assurance of the claimed identity
of an entity [47].
Authorisation: The granting of rights, by the owner or controller of a resource,
for others to access that resource [47].
Certification Authority (CA): A centre trusted to create and assign public
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key certificates. Optionally, the certification authority may create and assign
keys to the entities [61].
Confidentiality: The property that information is not made available or dis-
closed to unauthorised individuals, entities, or processes [69].
Data integrity: The property that data has not been altered or destroyed in an
unauthorised manner [69]. For the purposes of this thesis, when not specifically
stated otherwise, we use integrity to mean data integrity.
Data origin authentication: The corroboration that the source of data re-
ceived is as claimed [69].
Digital certificate: A digitally signed data structure containing an identifier
for an entity and certain information associated with that entity, e.g. a public
key or an access control attribute [40].
Non-repudiation of origin: Protects against the originator’s false denial of
having created the content of a message and of having sent a message [62].
Non-repudiation of receipt: Protects against a recipient’s false denial of
having received a message [62].
Public key certificate: A digital certificate containing a public key for an
entity.
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI): System consisting of TTPs, together with
the services they make available to provide certified public keys.
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Traffic flow confidentiality: A confidentiality service to protect against the
inference of information from observation of traffic flows [69].
Trusted Third Party (TTP): A security authority, or its representative,
trusted by other entities with respect to security related activities [67].
Security policy: A set of rules that apply to all security-relevant activities in
a domain [47].
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This chapter describes properties of agents and multi-agent systems, focusing
on properties with possible security implications. Security issues for multi-agent
systems are then identified.
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2.1 Introduction
This chapter briefly describes properties of agents and multi-agent systems (sec-
tion 2.2). It is not intended to be a complete description of agents multi-agent
systems (we are, for example, not concerned with AI properties for agents here).
The focus is restricted to issues with possible security implications. Using these
properties, the security issues for multi-agent systems are identified (section 2.3).
Finally, the conclusions of this chapter are presented in section 2.4. Some of
the work described in this chapter has been previously published in [9, 10]. For
further information on agents and multi-agent systems (MAS) see, for exam-
ple, [54, 80, 117].
The security analysis presented in this chapter is based on properties of agents
and open multi-agent systems. Security analyses have been presented elsewhere,
often with a particular application in mind, resulting in more narrow threat
scenarios compared to the general security issues presented in this chapter.
For a thorough analysis of mobile agent security see [78]. The malicious host
problem is described in some detail in [53, 56]. Other analyses of security issues
for mobile agents can be found in [26, 50, 98]. For general multi-agent systems,
not focusing on mobile agents, security analyses are more scarce. The following
publications all contain limited security analyses of multi-agent systems, mostly
in the context of a particular application or system implementation, [46, 55,
104, 106, 116].
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2.2 Agents and multi-agent systems
Agents are software entities that exhibit autonomy and certain ‘intelligence’.
An agent is often assumed to represent another entity, such as a human. No
single universal definition of agents exists, but there are certain widely agreed
universal characteristics of agents; these include situatedness, autonomy, and
flexibility [80].
• Situatedness means that the agent receives sensory input from its envi-
ronment and can perform actions which change the environment in some
way.
• Autonomy means that an agent is able to act without the direct inter-
vention of humans (or other agents), and that it has control over its own
actions and internal state.
• Flexibility can be defined to include the following properties:
– Responsive: refers to an agent’s ability to perceive its environment
and respond in a timely fashion to changes that occur in it.
– Pro-active: agents are able to exhibit opportunistic, goal-driven
behaviour and take the initiative where appropriate.
– Social: agents should be able to interact, when appropriate, with
other agents and humans in order to solve their own problems and
to help others with their activities.
A number of other attributes are sometimes discussed in the context of agent
systems. These include but are not limited to [80]:
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• Rationality: the assumption that an agent will not act in a manner
that prevents it from achieving its goals and will always attempt to fulfil
those goals.
• Veracity: an agent will not knowingly communicate false information.
• Benevolence: an agent cannot have conflicting goals that either force
it to transmit false information or to effect actions that cause its goals to
be unfulfilled or impeded.
• Mobility: the ability for an agent to move across networks and between
different hosts to fulfil its goals. For the purpose of this thesis we limit
the definition of mobile agents to those agents with the ability to migrate,
on their own initiative, during execution from one host to another where
they can resume their execution.
A multi-agent system (MAS) is a system composed of multiple autonomous
agents with the following characteristics [79]:
• each agent cannot solve a problem unaided,
• there is no global system control,
• data is decentralised, and
• computation is asynchronous.
Computer hosts, or platforms, provide agents with environments in which they
can execute. A platform typically also provides additional services, such as
communication facilities, to the agents it is hosting. In order for agents to be
able to form a useful open multi-agent system where they can communicate
31
2. Security issues in multi-agent systems
and cooperate, certain functionality needs to be provided to the agents. This
includes functionality to find other agents or to find particular services. This
additional functionality can either be implemented as services offered by other
agents or as services more integrated into the MAS infrastructure itself. Exam-
ples of such services include facilitators [19], matchmakers [20], mediators [114],
and blackboards [90].
Open multi-agent systems are usually envisioned as systems, communicating
over the Internet, allowing anybody to connect to a platform on which agents
are running. This means that the MAS lacks a global system control and that
information in general is highly decentralised.
2.3 Security implications
In this section we will discuss agent security issues based on the characteristics
described in the section 2.2. Security issues in agent systems have been analysed
previously, usually with a focus on a particular application or domain, see for
example [7, 94]. In this section we present a general analysis based on the
fundamentals of agents and MAS.
2.3.1 Agent Execution
Naturally, agents need to execute somewhere. A computer host, the immedi-
ate environment of an agent, is ultimately responsible for the correct execution
and protection of the agent. This leads to the question of where access control
decisions should be performed and enforced. Should an agent contain all neces-
sary logic and information required to decide if an incoming request is authentic
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(originating from its claimant) and if so, is it authorised (has the right to access
the requested information or service)? Or can agents rely on their execution
platform to provide access control services?
The environment might also need certain protection from the agents that it
hosts. An agent should, for example, be prevented from launching a denial of
service attack through consuming all resources on a host, thus preventing the
host from carrying out other things (such as executing other agents). Security
issues related to the executing host become even more apparent for agents that
are mobile, further described in section 2.3.5.
2.3.2 Situatedness
The meaning of the term ‘environment’ depends on the application and appears
to vary somewhat arbitrarily in the agent literature; it can for example be the
Internet or the host on which the agent is executing. An agent is assumed to
be ‘aware’ of certain states or events in its environment. Depending on the
nature and origin of this information, its authenticity and availability need to
be considered; (confidentiality of such information might also be relevant). If an
agent’s ‘environment’ is limited to the host on which it is executing, no specific
security measures might be necessary (assuming the host environment cannot
be spoofed). The situation is, however, likely to be different if the agent receives
environment information from, or via, the Internet. (Security of communication
is further explored in section 2.3.4.)
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2.3.3 Autonomy
Autonomy, when combined with other features given to agents, can introduce
serious security concerns. If an agent, for example, is given authority to buy or
sell things, it should not be possible for another party to force the agent into
committing to something it would not normally commit to. Neither should an
agent be able to make commitments it cannot fulfil. Hence, issues related to
delegation needs to be considered for agents.
The autonomy property does not necessarily introduce any ‘new’ security con-
cerns; this property is held by many existing systems. It is worth mentioning
that Internet worms (often referred to as viruses) also hold this property, which
enables them to spread efficiently without requiring any (intentional or unin-
tentional) human interaction. The lesson to learn from this is that powerful
features can also be used for malicious purposes if not properly controlled.
2.3.4 Communication
Of the flexibility properties, social behaviour is certainly interesting from a
security point of view. This means that agents can communicate with other
agents and humans. Just as an agent’s communication with its environment
needs to be protected, so does its communication with other agents and humans.
The following security properties should be provided:
• Confidentiality: assurance that communicated information is not accessi-
ble to unauthorised parties.
• Data integrity: assurance that communicated information cannot be ma-
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nipulated by unauthorised parties without being detected.
• Authentication of origin: assurance that communication originates from
its claimant.
• Availability: assurance that communication reaches its intended recipient
in a timely fashion.
In addition to these basic security properties, non-repudiation services should
be considered. One can distinguish non-repudiation of many actions (eight
non-repudiation services are defined in [62]). We believe the following non-
repudiation services to be the ones most useful in a generic agent system:
• Non-repudiation of origin: protects against the originator’s false denial of
having created the content of a message and of having sent a message [62].
• Non-repudiation of receipt: protects against the recipient’s false denial of
having received a message [62].
Fundamental to the above-mentioned communication security properties are is-
sues relating to the identification and authentication of the sending and receiving
parties. These issues are discussed further in section 2.3.7.
It should be noted that security usually comes at a cost. Additional computing
resources as well as communication resources are required by most solutions to
achieve the above-mentioned security requirements. Therefore, security needs
to be dynamic. Sometimes it makes sense to protect all communication within a
system to the same degree, as the actual negotiation of security mechanisms can
then be avoided. However, in a large scale open multi-agent system, security
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services and mechanisms need to be able to fit the purpose and nature of the
communications of various applications with differing security requirements.
Some implementations of MAS assume that security is provided transparently
by a lower layer. This approach might be sufficient in a closed system where the
agents can trust each other and the only concern is external malicious parties.
However, we believe that agents in an open system may often need to be ‘security
aware’, i.e. they need to be able to make decisions based on where information is
originating from and how well protected it is. As suggested elsewhere (e.g. [55]),
public key cryptography and a supporting Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) can
be used as important tools for securing inter-agent communication.
With a public key infrastructure in place, security protocols and mechanisms
already developed for other applications can be made to fit the requirements
of multi-agent systems to provide authentication, confidentiality, and data in-
tegrity.
2.3.5 Mobility
The use of mobile agents raises a number of security concerns. Agents need
protection from other agents and from the hosts on which they execute. Sim-
ilarly, hosts need to be protected from agents and from other parties that can
communicate with the platform. The problems associated with the protection
of hosts from malicious code are quite well understood.
The problem posed by malicious hosts to agents seems more complex to solve.
Since an agent is under the control of the executing host, the host can in principle
do anything to the agent and its code. The particular attacks that a malicious
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host can make have been described in [53] and [56], and can be summarised as
follows.
• Observation of code, data and flow control.
• Manipulation of code, data and flow control – including manipulating the
route of an agent.
• Incorrect execution of code – including re-execution.
• Denial of execution – either in part or whole.
• Masquerading as a different host.
• Eavesdropping on agent communications.
• Manipulation of agent communications.
• False system call return values.
2.3.6 Rationality, veracity, and benevolence
These properties could at a first glance appear to be very security relevant.
However, on closer consideration they seem to be too abstract for us to consider
as practical security concerns. The meaning (from a security point of view) of
these properties seems to be: “Agents are well behaved and will never act in a
malicious manner.” If we make this a genuine requirement, then the required
redundancy for such a system is likely to make the system useless. It would, of
course, be valuable to have a system where agents can be assumed to behave
truthfully and honestly in every situation. This does not seem a likely scenario
for a multi-agent system that is not under very strict control and under a single
authority, and would not correspond to the assumed open system scenario.
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However, measures can be taken to limit maliciously behaving agents. Assurance
that only information from trusted sources is acted upon and that agents (or
their owner) can be held responsible for their actions, as well as monitoring
and logging of agent behaviour, are all mechanisms that can help in creating a
system where the actions of malicious agents can be minimised.
2.3.7 Identification and authentication
Identification is not primarily a security issue in itself; however, the means
by which an agent is identified are likely to affect the way an agent can be
authenticated. For example, an agent could simply be identified by something
like a serial number, or its identity could be associated with its origin, owner,
capabilities, or privileges. As mentioned in section 2.3.4, authentication is often
fundamental to secure communication. If identities are not permanent, security-
related decisions cannot be made on the basis of an agent’s identity.
Connected with identification and authentication is anonymity. While an en-
tity’s identity is of major importance to certain applications and services, it is
not needed in others. An open multi-agent system would probably require some
sort of anonymity service to acquire wide acceptance today. In fact, agents are
likely to be ideal for providing anonymity to their owners as they are indepen-
dent pieces of code, possess some degree of autonomy, and do not require direct
user interaction.
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2.3.8 Anonymity
As mentioned in section 2.3.7, agents appear to be ideal for providing user
anonymity. However, anonymity can pose a big threat in an open system.
Agents are independent pieces of code, they possess some degree of autonomy,
and they do not require direct user interaction; without the ability to trace
agent activities to users, agents can be used to launch denial of service attacks.
2.3.9 Trust
Agents need to be able to make decisions based on information received and
collected from other entities. In order to make these decisions they need to
be able to evaluate the trustworthiness of the information or the information
source. A mobile agent needs to decide whether or not to transfer to, and
execute on, a particular host.
The issues surrounding trust within agent systems are currently attracting much
research within the agent community. Various mechanisms for agents to reason
about trust have been proposed, see, for example, [23]. Trust mechanisms based
on reputation are one approach suggested by a number of authors (e.g. [8, 99]).
Creating trust between entities without any, or very limited, common history
or knowledge of each other, which would be the case in an open MAS, is a
non-trivial task. Even though PKI technology still has to prove itself viable for
an open system on a global scale, a PKI may well be the best available solution
for distribution of trust in an open multi-agent system [18].
39
2. Security issues in multi-agent systems
2.3.10 Authorisation and delegation
Authorisation and delegation are important issues in multi-agent systems. Not
only do agents need to be granted rights to access information and other re-
sources in order to carry out their tasks, they will also be acting on behalf of
a person, organisation, or other agents, requiring transfer of access rights be-
tween different entities. With a public key infrastructure in place, delegation
can be done through various types of certificates, including attribute certifi-
cates for delegation of rights, and issuing of ‘traditional’ public key certificates
for delegation of signing rights.
2.4 Conclusions
In this chapter the security issues existing for open multi-agent systems have
been identified. The security issues are mainly related to agent execution and
the fact that, since agents are autonomous and need to act upon information
received from various entities, the trustworthiness of this information needs to
be guaranteed by the system and considered by the agent. Security issues related
to agent execution, and the fact that agents are under the control of a (perhaps
untrusted) executing host, are particularly relevant to mobile agents.
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This chapter describes available technologies and research efforts addressing se-
curity issues in multi-agent systems.
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3.1 Introduction
Based on the security analysis of chapter 2, three broad categories of neces-
sary security services for multi-agent systems can be distinguished, namely,
(1) those addressing the communication between agents, (2) services protecting
agents against malicious platforms, and (3) services protecting platforms against
malicious agents. This chapter describes existing technologies and research ef-
forts addressing these three categories. In section 3.2 we will consider measures
specifically addressing communication security issues for agents and MAS. The
two following sections describe available technologies and research efforts ad-
dressing the security issues arising from the mobility property of mobile agents.
Section 3.3 considers mechanisms addressing various security aspects of the mo-
bile agent, and section 3.4 examines technologies protecting the executing hosts
from misbehaving agents. Section 3.5 gives the conclusions of this chapter. Note
that security services specifically relevant to multi-agent systems are discussed
further in chapter 5. This latter discussion is given in the context of the agent
security architecture introduced in chapter 4, whereas the discussion in this
chapter focuses primarily on the existing work in the area
3.2 Security measures for agent communication
Many commercial and research MAS architectures have been implemented and
many are still under development1. Several of these recognise security as an issue
to be taken care of in the future, whilst others imply that security is provided for.
It is common for MAS implementations to assume a VPN-like (Virtual Private
Network) underlying network to provide security services. This approach usu-
1See http://www.agentbuilder.com/AgentTools for a list of available systems.
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ally does not provide for much flexibility, since secure communication between
parties without pre-established relationships becomes cumbersome. Neverthe-
less, this solution can use well established security protocols and be adequate
for applications where all communication is protected to the same degree. Such
an approach usually leaves the agents completely unaware of security services as
this is handled between agent platforms (or perhaps even at the link level). The
agents themselves are also unprotected from malicious hosts if no other security
measures are applied.
Communication security can also be implemented at the session layer. [28] pro-
poses the use of TLS (Transport Layer Security) to protect agent communication
sessions. The proposed implementation allows the agent to rely on the host for
negotiation of security parameters, as well as the agent to supply its security
parameters for the TLS sessions.
FIPA2 is a non-profit standards organisation that is developing standards for
software agents to allow heterogeneous agent systems to interact. There are
a growing number of agent projects, platforms and agent applications based
on the FIPA standard (see, for example, [91]). Earlier, today outdated, FIPA
documents did consider some security issues. However, the current standards
do not deal with security. FIPA has recognised this and recently initiated work
in the area3. [92] includes a very brief attempt to add security to a FIPA
agent system, where it is suggested that the agent platform implements both
authentication of agents and facilitators (entities offering certain services to
agents) and the use of encrypted channels. However, no details are included,
and how key management and authentication should be provided is not specified.
2Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents, see http://www.fipa.org
3See http://www2.elec.qmul.ac.uk/~stefan/fipa-security for the state and progress of
this work.
43
3. Security measures for multi-agent systems
We consider the FIPA specifications further in chapter 7.
KQML (Knowledge Query and Manipulation Language) [48] is a message pro-
tocol designed to enable software agents to communicate with each other. The
protocol has been developed as part of an ARPA project. KQML does not deal
with security issues but depends on security being provided by lower layers.
[106] proposes a security architecture for KQML. Symmetric or asymmetric
cryptography is supported and keys are assumed to be agreed beforehand. The
proposed extension provides for confidentiality, authentication, and (limited)
data integrity protection. However, as pointed out by the authors, it does not
protect against message replay attacks. A solution using mediating agents to
enable communication with crypto un-aware agents is also proposed. Another
suggestion for enhancing KQML with security is proposed in [55]. Parame-
ters for certificate management are defined leaving the format of the certificate
undefined.
3.3 Protecting mobile agents
Addressing the security threats that arise to mobile agents from potentially ma-
licious host environments is recognised by the security community as a difficult
but vitally important problem. As a result, there have been many attempts to
address the threats posed to mobile agents, most addressing a particular part
of the problem.
As stated in section 2.3.5, once an agent has arrived at a host, little can be
done to stop the host from treating the agent as it likes. The problem is usually
referred to as the malicious host problem. A simple example, often used to
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illustrate how a malicious host can benefit from attacking a mobile agent, is the
shopping agent. An agent is sent out to find the best airfare for a flight with
a particular route. The agent is given various requirements, such as departure
and destination, time restrictions, etc., and sent out to find the cheapest ticket
before committing to a particular purchase. The agent will visit every airline
and query their databases before committing to a purchase and reporting back
to the agent owner. A malicious host can interfere with the agent execution in
several ways in order to make its offer appear most attractive. For example,
a malicious host could try to: (1) erase all information previously collected by
the agent – in this way the host is guaranteed at least to have the best current
offer; (2) change the agent’s route so that airlines with more favourable offers
are not visited; (3) simply terminate the agent to ensure that no competitor
gets the business either; (4) make the agent execute its commitment function,
ensuring that the agent is committing to the offer given by the malicious host
(if the agent is carrying electronic money it could instead take it from the agent
directly). In addition to this, the agent might be carrying information that
needs to be kept secret from the airlines (e.g. maximum price).
There is no universal solution to the malicious host problem, but some partial
solutions have been proposed. Many of the security mechanisms are aimed at
detecting, rather than preventing, misbehaving hosts. In the following subsec-
tions we will describe some of the mechanisms proposed to address the malicious
host problem.
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3.3.1 Contractual agreements
The simplest solution (at least from a technical perspective) is to use contrac-
tual means to tackle the malicious host problem. Operators of agent platforms
guarantee, via contractual agreements, to operate their environments securely
and not to violate the privacy or the integrity of the agent, its data, and its
computation. However, to prove that such an agreement has been broken might
be a non-trivial task.
3.3.2 Trusted hardware
If the operators of the available execution environments cannot be trusted, one
obvious solution is to let a trusted third party supply trusted hardware, in
the form of tamper resistant devices, that are placed at the site of the host
and interact with the agent platform [115]. A tamper resistant device can,
for example, come in the form of a smart card. Such trusted hardware can
then either protect the complete execution environment of the agent or perform
certain security sensitive tasks. However, such trusted hardware must be used
carefully and might appear to offer more security than it really does. The
agent must still be able to communicate with resources at the local platform
(the part under control of an untrusted party), for example to interact with a
local database. All such interactions can still be intercepted by the untrusted
party. We note that, in the case where interactions with a database is required,
techniques (e.g. Private Information Retrieval – PIR [27]) have been proposed
allowing retrieval of information without revealing what information is being
retrieved.
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If the trusted hardware is only used to protect security sensitive actions this
might be even more vulnerable. It might, for example, be tempting to let the
agent’s private signature key be protected such that it only will be available
when decrypted inside the trusted device. A signature algorithm can then be
executed within the device using the agent’s private key. In this way, the private
signature key is never exposed to the host. However, the host might be able
to interfere with the communication taking place between the agent residing
on the host and the trusted device in such a way that a correct signature is
produced on information falsely manufactured by the host. Above all else, the
major drawback of trusted hardware is the cost of such a solution.
Two ongoing efforts, namely the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) [107] and
Next-Generation Secure Computing Base (NGSCB) [101], have the goal of pro-
viding trusted computing sub-systems. These technologies appear to have the
potential to provide a trusted environment for mobile agents. The functionality
provided by these schemes includes, protected execution, protected storage, and
platform authentication.
3.3.3 Trusted nodes
By introducing trusted nodes into the infrastructure, to which mobile agents
can migrate when required, sensitive information can be prevented from being
sent to untrusted hosts, and certain misbehaviours of malicious hosts can be
traced. The owner’s host, i.e. the platform from where the mobile agent is first
launched, is usually assumed to be a trusted node. In addition to this, service
providers can operate trusted nodes in the infrastructure.
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This approach does not appear to be fully explored elsewhere. The approach
can potentially be very valuable in a mixed wireless and fixed network, allowing
users to despatch mobile agents into the fixed network, relying on trusted nodes
for processing of ‘sensitive’ information.
In our example with the shopping agent, the mobile agent can be constructed so
that the commitment function (e.g. the agent’s signature key) is encrypted such
that it can only be decrypted at a trusted host. Once the agent arrives at the
trusted host it can compare the collected offers and commit to the best offer.
Alternatively, one agent containing the ability to commit to a purchase can be
sent to a trusted node. From this node one or several sub-agents are sent to
the airline hosts to collect offers. Depending on the threat scenario, single hop
agents can be used, that is agents only visiting one host before returning back, or
one or several multi-hop agents can be used. Once the sub-agent or agents have
returned to the trusted node, the best offer is selected and the agent commits
to a purchase. This last alternative does limit the agent’s mobility, but may be
beneficial in certain scenarios. This approach is further explored in chapter 9.
3.3.4 Co-operating agents
By using cooperating agents, a similar result to that of trusted nodes can be
achieved [96]. Information and functionality can be split between two or more
agents in such a way that it is not enough to compromise only one (or even
several) agents in order to compromise the task. An identical scenario to that
described using trusted nodes can, for example, be achieved by letting the agent
residing on the trusted host be executed on any host that is assumed not to be
conspiring with any of the airlines.
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By applying fault tolerant techniques the malicious behaviour of a few hosts can
be countered. One such scheme for ensuring that a mobile agent arrives safely
at its destination has been proposed in [100]. Although a malicious platform
may cause an agent to operate incorrectly, the existence of enough replicates
ensures the correct end result.
Again, referring to the shopping agent, several mobile agents can be used, taking
different routes, and before deciding on the best offer the agents communicate
their votes amongst each other. Techniques based on these ideas are further
described in chapter 9.
3.3.5 Execution tracing
Execution tracing [110] has been proposed for detecting unauthorised modifica-
tions of an agent through the faithful recording of the agent’s execution on each
agent platform. Each platform is required to create and retain a non-repudiable
log of the operations performed by the agent while executing on the platform.
The major drawbacks of this approach are not only the size of the logs created,
but also the necessary management of created logs. In addition, privacy issues
are likely to arise when this kind of information is logged.
Partial Result Authentication Codes (PRACs) were introduced by Yee [119].
The idea is to protect the authenticity of an intermediate agent state or partial
result that results from running on a server. PRACs can be generated using
symmetric cryptographic algorithms. The agent is equipped with a number
of encryption keys. Every time the agent migrates from a host, the agent’s
state or some other result is processed using one of the keys, producing a MAC
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(Message Authentication Code) on the message. The key that has been used
is then disposed of before the agent migrates. The PRAC can be verified at a
later point to identify certain types of tampering. A similar functionality can be
achieved using asymmetric cryptography by letting the host produce a signature
on the information instead.
3.3.6 Encrypted payload
Asymmetric cryptography (also known as public key cryptography) is well suited
for a mobile agent that needs to send back results to its owner or which collects
information along its route before returning with its encrypted payload to its
owner. This is due to the fact that the encryption key does not need to be
kept secret. However, to encrypt very small messages is either very insecure
or results in a large overhead compared with the original message. A solution
called sliding encryption [120] has been proposed that allows small amounts of
data to be encrypted, and consequently added to the cryptogram, such that the
length of the resulting ciphertext is minimised. Due to the nature of asymmetric
cryptography the agent is not able to access its own encrypted payload until
arriving at a trusted host where the corresponding decryption key is available.
3.3.7 Environmental key generation
Environmental key generation [95] allows an agent to carry encrypted code or
information. The encrypted data can be decrypted when some predefined envi-
ronmental condition is true. Using this method an agent’s private information
can be encrypted and only revealed to the environment once the predefined
condition is met. This requires that the agent has access to some predictable
50
3. Security measures for multi-agent systems
information source; several examples of such information sources are given in
[95]. Once the private information has been revealed, it would, of course, be re-
vealed to the executing host. However, if the condition is not met on a particular
host, the private information is not revealed to the platform.
3.3.8 Computing with encrypted functions
Sander and Tschudin [98] have proposed a scheme whereby an agent platform
can execute a program embodying an enciphered function without being able
to access the original function. For example, instead of equipping an agent with
function f , the agent owner can give the agent a program P(E(f)) which im-
plements E(f), an encrypted version of f . The agent can then execute P(E(f))
on x, yielding an encrypted version of f(x).
With this approach an agent’s execution would be kept secret from the executing
host as would any information carried by the agent. For example the means to
produce a digital signature could thereby be given to an agent without revealing
the private key. However, a malicious platform could still use the agent to
produce a signature on arbitrary data. Sander and Tschudin therefore suggest
combining the method with undetachable signatures (see section 3.3.10).
Although the idea is straightforward, the problem is to find appropriate encryp-
tion schemes that can transform functions as intended; this remains a research
topic. Recently Barak et al. [4] have shown that obtaining theoretical justifica-
tion for a program’s ability to completely hide its information appears infeasible.
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3.3.9 Obfuscated code
Hohl [57] proposes what he refers to as Blackbox security to scramble an agent’s
code in such a way that no one is able to gain a complete understanding of
its function. However, no general algorithm or approach exists for providing
Blackbox security. A time-limited variant of Blackbox protection is proposed
as a reasonable alternative. This could be applicable where an agent only needs
to be protected for a short period. One serious drawback of this scheme is the
difficulty of quantifying the protection time provided by the obfuscated algo-
rithm. Nevertheless, commercial applications are available that protect software
by obfuscating the code in various ways [29].
3.3.10 Undetachable signatures
By binding usage restrictions to a signature key given to the agent, we can
potentially limit the damage a malicious host can do. Sander and Tschudin [98]
proposed one such scheme, which they refer to as undetachable signatures. Their
original scheme has since been improved [81]. The idea is to encode constraints
into the signature key. If the constraints are not met a valid signature is not
produced, preventing arbitrary messages from being signed.
Undetachable signatures, as proposed by Sander and Tschudin [98], are based on
the idea of computing with encrypted functions. The host executes a function
s ◦ f , where f is an encrypting function, without having access to the user’s
private signature function s. The security of the method lies in the encrypting
function f . Whilst Sander and Tschudin were unable to propose a satisfactory
scheme, more recently Kotzanikolaou, Burmester and Chrissikopoulos [81] have
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presented an RSA-based scheme which appears to be secure.
The idea of an undetachable signature is as follows. Suppose a user wishes to
purchase a product from an electronic shop. The agent can commit to the trans-
action only if the agent can use the signature function s of the user. However as
the server where the agent executes may be hostile, the signature is protected
by a function f to obtain g = s ◦ f . The user then gives the agent the pair
(f, g) of functions as part of its code. The server then executes the pair (f, g)
on an input x (where x encodes transaction details) to obtain the undetachable
signature pair
f(x) = m and g(x) = s(m).
The pair of functions allows the agent to create signatures for the user whilst
executing on the server without revealing s to the server. The parameters of the
function f are such that the output of f includes the user’s constraints. Thus
m links the constraints of the customer to the bid of the server. This is then
certified by the signature on this message. The main point is that the server
cannot sign arbitrary messages, because the function f is linked to the user’s
constraints.
An alternative to undetachable signatures proposed in this thesis (see chapter 8)
is to use digital certificates to regulate the validity of digital signatures. Digital
certificates are used to let a verifier check the validity of a digital signature.
Certificates usually include a validity period under which valid signatures can be
produced. By extending the constraints included in the certificate to context-
related values such as executing host, maximum value of a purchase, and so
on, certificates can be used to further restrict the usage of signature keys and
thereby decrease the involved risks regarding improper use of the signature key.
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One advantage with this scheme over undetachable signatures is that it relies
on already well-established cryptographic techniques.
3.4 Protecting the agent platform
Generally speaking, more mature technology is available to address the prob-
lem of protecting the agent platform from malicious agents than is available to
protect agents against malicious platforms. This problem also appears easier
to solve than the malicious host problem. Techniques similar to those used to
address security issues associated with downloading software from the Internet
can be applied to the mobile agent scenario. We next describe some of these
techniques.
3.4.1 Sandboxing and safe code interpretation
Sandboxing [49] isolates applications (or in our case agents) into distinct do-
mains enforced by software. The technique allows untrusted programs to be
executed within their own virtual address space thereby preventing them from
interfering with other applications. Access to system resources can also be con-
trolled through a unique identifier associated with each domain.
Agents are usually developed using an interpreted script or programming lan-
guage. The main motivation for this is to support agent platforms on hetero-
geneous computer systems. The idea behind safe code interpretation is that
commands considered insecure can either be made safe or denied to the agent.
Java is probably the most widely used interpretative language used today. Java
[86] also utilises sandboxing and signed code (described in section 3.4.3); this
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makes Java well suited for development of agents.
3.4.2 Proof carrying code
Proof carrying code [89] requires the author of an agent to formally prove that
the agent conforms to a certain security policy. The execution platform can then
check the agent and the proof before executing the agent. The agent can then
be run without any further restrictions. The major drawback of this approach
is the difficulty in generating such formal proofs in an automated and efficient
way.
3.4.3 Signed code
By digitally signing an agent, its authenticity, origin, and integrity can be veri-
fied by the recipient. Typically the code signer is either the creator of the agent,
the agent owner (on whose behalf the agent is acting), or some party that has
reviewed the agent. The security policy at the recipient platform, perhaps in
conjunction with attribute certificates supplied with the signed code, would then
decide if a particular signature means that the code should be executed.
3.4.4 Path histories
The idea behind path histories [25] is to let a host know where a mobile agent
has been executed previously. If the agent has been running on a host that is
not trusted, the newly visited host can decide not to let the agent execute or to
restrict the execution privileges. Path histories require each host to add a signed
entry to the path, indicating its identity and the identity of the next platform
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to be visited, and to supply the complete path history to the next host.
3.4.5 State appraisal
State appraisal [39] attempts to ensure that an agent’s state has not been tam-
pered with and that the agent will not carry out any illegal actions through
a state appraisal function which becomes part of the agent code. The agent
author produces the appraisal function which is signed by the author, together
with the rest of the agent. An agent platform uses the function to verify that
an incoming agent is in a correct state and to determine what privileges an
agent can be granted during execution. The theory, which is still to be proven
in practice, requires that the legal states can be captured and described in an
efficient and secure way.
3.5 Conclusions
The security issues for non-mobile agents can, at least in theory, to a great
extent be tackled through existing security technology and protocols. However,
issues related to trust and delegation in a large scale multi agent system are
non-trivial to solve. Although a public key infrastructure is likely to be an
important part of the solution, agents need to be able to reason and make
decisions based on various security parameters. Execution of agents (mobile as
well as non-mobile) on untrusted platforms is another factor introducing non-
trivial security concerns, in particular related to correct agent execution and
confidentiality of agent data.
There does not seem to be a single solution to the security problems introduced
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by mobile agents unless trusted hardware is introduced, which is likely to prove
too expensive for most applications. The way forward appears to lie in a range
of mechanisms aimed at solving particular (smaller) problems. This could, for
example, include mechanisms that depend on agents executing on several hosts
rather than on only one host, mechanisms and protocols binding agent actions
to hosts, generation of various types of audit information that can be used in
case of disputes, and so on. Solutions to certain problems do exist, but for
mobile agents to be more widely adopted this is an area that requires further
research.
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In this chapter a security architecture for agent based mobile systems is proposed.
The architecture has four levels of abstraction: involved parties, device structure,
agent execution environment, and the agent.
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4.1 Introduction
Within this chapter a model specifically designed for analysing security issues
within an agent-based mobile system is presented. The model is presented
at four different levels of abstraction. This enables all types of interactions,
including those within a device and those spanning the entire mobile system, to
be modelled. Some of the work described in this chapter has been previously
published in [11].
This chapter contains four main sections, each containing a model for a dif-
ferent level of abstraction, starting with the highest level and working down.
Specifically, the contents are as follows.
Section 4.2 describes the Involved parties and their roles. This section provides
the highest level of abstraction in this chapter.
Section 4.3 considers the structure of a Device, one component of which is an
agent execution environment. Note that we use the general term ‘device’ to
include any hardware component which constitutes part of the mobile system.
This covers any hardware component that uses wireless networking of some
kind. Examples would include mobile terminals and parts of terminals as well
as non-mobile computers that are part of the agent system.
Section 4.4 describes this Agent execution environment in more detail, focusing
on security functionality.
In section 4.5 we consider the various parts of an Agent and how it interacts
with its environment. Section 4.6 then gives the conclusions of the chapter.
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4.2 Involved parties
This section describes the high level entities that can be distinguished in the
security model. The parties can be thought of as distinct individuals or or-
ganisations. However, in practice one organisation can take the roles of more
than one entity. It is also possible that not every party would be involved in a
particular scenario.
Device user: also referred to as user. The user is assumed to have physical
control over the device, but may not necessarily be the same entity as the device
owner.
Device provider: the manufacturer of the device. In order for the manufac-
turer to offer upgrades or additional services, the device provider will typically
share a security context with the device. This security context will typically
involve shared secrets and/or the provision of ‘root’ public keys.
Device owner: this might, for example, be the user or the employer of the
user. Again there is a trust and possibly a cryptographic relationship with the
device. The rationale for distinguishing the device owner from the device user
is the fact that they might have different objectives. An employer might, for
example, want to restrict the use of a device in order to protect itself from
various threats, such as malicious code.
Service Provider (SP): provides some kind of service, (e.g. transport service,
information service, payment service, etc.) including directory services and re-
mote agent execution environments to users and other SPs. A service provider
may or may not have a pre-established contract with its clients.
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‘Home’ Service Provider (HSP): i.e. an entity with which the device owner
or device user has a contractual relationship. This gives the provider of services
to the device an identifiable entity from which he can extract payment (the HSP
will then present a bill for all services provided to the device owner). Note that
a device owner may have many HSPs.
Trust Service Provider (TSP): a special class of service provider providing
trusted third party services, e.g. a CA (Certification Authority), an RA (Regis-
tration Authority), a timestamping service, an electronic notary, etc. [65].
Agent provider: provides other parties with agents. The agent provider would
typically be the developer of the agent. The agent provider can rely on its
reputation or can issue other guarantees concerning provided agents’ behaviour.
The agent provider and the agent owner can be different entities. One can
envision a scenario where software developers provide (e.g. sell) agents to users.
The users would then only need to provide the agent with certain credentials
and perhaps specify its objectives.
Agent owner: the entity on whose behalf an agent is executing. All parties can
deploy agents to act on their behalf. These agents can execute on a device under
the control of the agent owner as well as in other places within the infrastructure.
4.3 Device structure
This section describes the different parts of a device, including most importantly
agents and the agent execution environment. A diagram of the device model is
given in figure 4.1. Only one agent is shown in the figure, but a device would
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typically have multiple agents executing in the agent execution environment.
It should be noted that devices and their resources can vary greatly, and de-
pending on their purpose might not include all the components described here.
The device described is a mobile one, but a similar structure can be assumed to
exist within other devices where agents are executed within the infrastructure.
non-agent
software
agent
agent
execution
environment
remote resources
device resources subscriptionmodule
Figure 4.1: A model for the elements within a device
The constituent elements of the device model are as follows.
Agent: executable code which is acting on behalf of its owner. All parties can
use agents to represent themselves. An agent can execute in an environment
that is under the control of its (i.e. the agent’s) owner, or it may execute in an
environment provided by another party. Agents may or may not be mobile. As
illustrated in figure 4.1, an agent can communicate with other entities over a
network as well as with other functional blocks within the same device, including
device resources, a subscription module, other agents, and other device software.
Agent execution environment: provides the resources required for agents to
execute and communicate with other agents as well as with other resources and
entities. The agent execution environment, further described in section 4.4, is
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regulated and controlled through mechanisms here referred to as agent control.
Several agents can execute simultaneously within one environment.
Subscription module: a hardware device (e.g. smart card, USB token) which
may interact with the device. An example of such a module is the GSM SIM
[111]. This module would typically be provided by a Home Service Provider
(HSP), and would share secret keys with a HSP and/or possess HSP-provided
root public keys. Not every mobile device will be capable of directly interacting
with such modules but some will, and hence it needs to be included in the model.
Remote resources: agents executing in a device can communicate with re-
sources (e.g. agents and services) on other devices.
Non-agent software: software (applications and middleware functions) resid-
ing on the same device but not under the control of the agent platform control
functionality. Agents can communicate with such software just as such software
would be able to interact with agents.
Device resources: refers to other resources residing in the device. Examples
of such resources include a user interface, a hardware crypto-engine, various
cryptographic primitives that might be bound to the device (e.g. in the form of
a cryptographic API), and communication resources.
4.4 Agent execution environment
In this section the security functionality of the agent execution environment
is described. We are only considering security functionality here, and a com-
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plete execution environment would be more complex. A diagram of the agent
execution environment is given in figure 4.2.
It should be noted that, depending on the device on which the agent execu-
tion environment is residing, not all the elements of this model may exist. A
device might, for example, not support the downloading of agents – in which
case the agent mobility service would not exist. The complete agent execution
environment will include the following elements.
Agent management and control: is the governing security platform element.
This element is responsible for managing all agents executing on the platform in-
cluding monitoring and controlling access to resources as well as communication
between agents executing on the local platform.
Agent communication services: provides communications facilities to agents
executing within the environment. This includes secure communication services.
Agent security services: includes security services provided by the environ-
ment to executing agents. For example, the environment may add a digital
signature to data (signed with the private device signature key) at the request
of an agent.
Agent mobility service: enables agents to send themselves (and associated
stored state) to other devices. The agent mobility service also includes function-
ality to assess received agents and any associated security information to decide
if an agent shall be granted permission to execute on the platform. Agents
requesting transfer to another platform will also be assessed for appropriate
privileges by this entity. If required, the agent mobility service can add plat-
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form specific information (e.g. agent path history) before transmission. The
agent mobility service is responsible for setting up secure transmission channels
when required for agent transfers.
Event logging service: logs security relevant events for storage in an audit
trail. It may also provide security intrusion detection based on processing of
recorded events. Such detected events, or combinations thereof, would then
result in a notification to another sub-system (e.g. agent management and con-
trol), which would then take appropriate action.
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Figure 4.2: agent execution environment architecture
In addition to the described elements, which make up the execution environ-
ment, the elements/functionality below (which also appear in figure 4.2) are
part of the architecture.
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The security policy and access control database regulate the behaviour of
the security mechanisms. One example of information making up the security
policy could be a rule base describing how, and under what circumstances,
agents can be given access to the execution environment, and can interact with
each other and their environments. Other examples include the specification
of security related events for which log entries should be generated, and what
controls should be implemented in order for an agent to start execution. The
access control database contains information governing how various resources
can be accessed by the various parties. This information could, for example, be
in the form of an Access Control List (ACL) [49] or a set of capabilities [49], or
some combination of the two. This database can be physically located on the
device, handled remotely over a communication link, or be implemented as a
combination of local and remote facilities.
Remote systems can dispatch agents to the platform in order for them to be
executed. In the same manner, the agent execution environment can dispatch
agents to execute in other environments.
Log storage and post processing manages and processes log data once gen-
erated. This functionality can be physically located on the device, handled
remotely over a communication link, or as a combination of the two.
Device resources and subscription module includes any resources (hard-
ware and software) residing on the device.
Trust Service Provider (TSP) (as described in section 4.2) provides various
trust services.
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Remote resources are resources residing on other platforms with which agents
can communicate, including other agents.
4.5 Agent construction
The various parts of an agent are likely to have different properties that need
to be addressed through appropriate security mechanisms. The following dis-
tinctions between component parts of an agent can be made. Note that this
agent model is designed for the purposes of security analysis only. As a result,
important agent functionality may not be covered within this model.
Core executable part: information that can be executed. This information
is distinguished from other information to allow a user to obtain an agent from
an independent party (agent provider).
Payloads: An agent is likely to have various kinds of payloads. Payloads can
consist of non-executable data as well as executable information required by the
agent to fulfil its task. Execution state, information supplied by the agent owner,
and information collected at various hosts (for mobile agents), are all examples
of payloads of an agent. In addition to this, an agent can obtain executable
payloads to add agent functionality that is not part of the core executable part.
By separating agent parts in this way integrity verification values can be cre-
ated where appropriate. The use of the above distinctions becomes particularly
important for mobile agents, but is also relevant for agents that are transferred
to be executed on a platform not belonging to the agent provider. (As in sec-
tion 2.2, we are here defining a mobile agent to be an agent that can move ‘on
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its own initiative’ and continue execution in the environment where it arrives.)
4.6 Conclusions
In this chapter a security architecture for agent based mobile systems has been
proposed. The model includes the involved parties at the highest level, then a
device structure, an agent execution environment, and finally, the structure of
an agent.
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This chapter describes security functionality for an agent based mobile system
and outlines possible approaches for their realisation.
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5.1 Introduction
In this chapter we specify a set of security services for agent based mobile
systems within the context of the security model specified in chapter 4. The
security services are divided into three main classes, namely security services
to protect the execution platform, security services aimed at protecting agents,
and communication security services.
Section 5.2 describes security functionality and where this functionality fits into
the architecture. In section 5.3 possible approaches for how the security func-
tionality can be implemented are outlined. Finally, section 5.4 gives the conclu-
sions of this chapter.
5.2 Security functionality
This section specifies and motivates security services and mechanisms useful
within an agent based mobile system. Section 5.2.1 defines security function-
ality applicable to platform protection, section 5.2.2 defines functionality for
protecting agents, and section 5.2.3 defines security services for communication
within the system.
5.2.1 Platform protection
In this section we will define security functionality primarily directed at ad-
dressing the security of the execution environment. Again, we note that agent
execution environments will exist in various kinds of devices and the precise
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functionality, including security functionality, provided by the environment will
also vary. Hence, the functionality described here may not be implemented in
every device.
Logical access control
Multiple agents as well as other applications and system software are assumed
to be executing on the same host and thereby be sharing system resources. The
executing host needs to ensure that agents (and other software entities) are not
interfering with each other or the system in unauthorised ways.
Logical access controls ensure that agents (or other software entities) cannot
interfere with each other or the platform in unauthorised ways. The agent man-
agement and control element is the main entity within the agent environment
architecture enforcing access control. However, access control is also part of the
functionality of the mobility service, event logging service, agent security service,
and agent communication services.
Authentication of foreign code
In order to provide flexibility a host will need to be able to receive, retrieve and
execute agents. In fact, this applies to any kind of software, not only agents. In
a mobile environment, with constant changes taking place, the ability to receive
and execute software is likely to be very important functionality.
In order for an agent to be executed (with more than a very minimum of priv-
ileges), the origin of the code would need to be established. When an agent
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arrives at the execution environment it is handled by the mobility service. Here
various security checks are made.
Authorisation of foreign code
Before an agent (or any other piece of downloaded code) is allowed to commence
its execution, it needs to be authorised to do so. For any kind of action requested
by the agent the host needs to ensure that the agent is authorised to proceed.
Authorisation issues would be resolved at various parts within the system, partly
depending on the trust model and authorisation model chosen. However, the
mobility service would make an initial decision as to whether an agent should
be allowed to commence execution and a trusted service provider is likely to be
involved in issuing authorisation credentials for agents.
Secure communication
The platform will be required to communicate with other entities within the
infrastructure. For example, agents will be transferred to and from other plat-
forms, and various trusted service providers need to be contacted. Depending
on the nature and sensitivity of the communication, various levels of protec-
tion will be required. Requirements and motivation for communication security
services are further developed in section 5.2.3.
Any of the elements capable of communicating with other parties would be
responsible for providing communications security services.
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Event logging
As opposed to most other security features, which are in place to prevent security
breaches, auditing and monitoring enable follow-up when something goes wrong.
The main purpose of audit trails is to provide information that can be examined
at a later point in time. Examples of applications for audit data include fraud
detection, intrusion detection, follow-up in case of failure, and follow-up in case
of a security breach. Audit information can also be used for real-time monitoring
in order to take immediate actions in case of security violation.
The event logging service within the agent execution environment is responsible
for generating audit trails. The security policy governs the definition of security
events to be logged. (As described in section 5.2.2 below, audit events can also
be generated at the initiative of an agent.)
5.2.2 Agent protection
In this section we define security functionality that is offered to agents (mobile
and non-mobile). Some functionality is offered as services by the executing
platform or by a third party, while other functions would be implemented in the
agent itself.
Access control
An agent’s information needs to be protected from unauthorised access by other
entities executing on the same host, as well as from remote entities. An agent
might also need protection from the host on which it is executing.
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Logical access control is enforced by various elements on the host, but mainly by
the agent management and control element. Certain information and execution
can be protected by physical means through the use of a subscription module.
Agent authentication
In order for an agent to be sure about the identity of another agent, agents need
the ability to authenticate each other, and to authenticate themselves towards
an agent platform and towards service providers.
The agent security services element would help an agent to prove its identity,
at least to the extent of proving the agent’s location.
Platform authentication
Platforms will need to authenticate themselves to agents on other hosts, agents
executing on the host itself, and to other hosts.
Depending on the purpose of this authentication, the agent mobility service, the
agent security services and the agent communication services are the elements
most likely to be required to prove their identities to an agent.
Authorisation
Depending on an agent’s task and purpose, it might need to determine if a
platform or agent should be granted access to certain information, or whether
certain actions should be taken by the agent itself.
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Such authorisation decisions would need to be taken by the agent itself or specif-
ically delegated to another party by the agent.
Secure agent mobility
The model proposed for the agent based mobile system allows for agent mobility
as well as downloadable agents. A mobile agent can (on its own initiative) move
between platforms, while a downloadable agent would be pulled by the device
or pushed by a third party onto the device, usually to enhance the functionality
of the device in some way.
Functionality involved when agents are transferring from one host to another is
offered by the mobility services. Whatever criteria are used for agent mobility, a
protected audit trail can be very important to prove that a host has acted in an
illicit manner. The event generation functionality is explained further below.
Agent communication
Agents have capabilities to communicate with other agents as well as with other
entities that exist on the same device as the agent or on remote devices. This
communication will, depending on its nature and sensitivity, need various levels
of protection. Agents need to be offered the ability to be ‘security aware’. Even
if security functionality is not directly implemented in the agent, the agent
may need to be able to access certain security functionality/properties from the
executing platform, as well as being informed about the circumstances under
which information has been transferred. Such information is important to let
agents decide the origin of data and its trustworthiness.
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Inter platform communication is protected by agent management and control
and intra platform agent communication is provided through agent commu-
nication services. (Intra platform agent communication is further covered in
section 5.2.3.)
Event Logging
In a system where proper security is difficult to achieve or where the level of
security is traded off against performance criteria, (as is likely to be the case with
mobile agents) having transaction data that can be examined at a later point in
time can be very important. Not only can this information be examined when
needed, it can also deter illegal behaviour. Agents need the ability to generate
audit trails that can be examined if needed.
Events logged locally, or processed by the local environment (and possibly then
dispatched elsewhere), are handled by the event logging service. If the logging
functionality is handled completely by the agent no other services would have to
be involved apart from the agent communication services if events are dispatched
to other agents/platforms and perhaps a non-repudiation service.
Anonymous execution
The possibility for users to have agents acting on their behalf without giving
other parties the means to trace the actions to the user is potentially an im-
portant factor for user acceptance (anonymity also introduces vulnerabilities,
including denial of service attacks, see section 2.3.8).
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No specific service on the execution device is necessarily required to allow agents
run without a traceable user. (Anonymous transactions are covered in sec-
tion 5.2.3.)
5.2.3 Communication security services
In this section we will briefly describe communication security services and the
motivation for their use within a multi-agent system.
Integrity of communication
Integrity protects against improper modifications of messages, duplication of
messages, deletion of part or all of the messages in a sequence, or reordering of
parts of a message sequence.
Integrity is closely linked to origin authentication (see below). Without an
authenticated source for data, assurance of maintained integrity does not usu-
ally mean much. Data origin authentication also requires the provision of data
integrity. However, certain integrity properties might be of less importance de-
pending on the application (for example, message duplication may be a relatively
minor threat for many applications).
Authentication
Authentication is fundamental for secure communication, and is about the as-
surance of the claimed identity of an entity. Two forms of authentication can
be distinguished:
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• Entity authentication, the corroboration that an entity is the one claimed.
Applies to connection oriented communication.
• Data origin authentication, the corroboration that the source of data re-
ceived is as claimed. Applies to connectionless communication.
Agents as well as platforms need to be authenticated as well as be able to ensure
the identity of another party. This entity authentication service is normally
provided by the use of an appropriate authentication protocol [87]. For the
purpose of authentication protocols, no distinction need be made between agents
and platforms (a platform can in practice be represented by an agent).
For the envisioned system, i.e. a multi-agent system in a mobile telecommuni-
cation environment, entity authentication as well as data origin authentication
are required. Data origin authentication is, for example, required for simple
message passing between agents. Entity authentication can be required when
an agent is involved in real-time data provision, such as real-time video.
Non-repudiation
Non-repudiation is about preventing entities denying their actions. Non-repudiation
can be regarded as an extension to authentication. Digital signatures often play
an important role in non-repudiation protocols. In addition to this, the provision
of non-repudiation requires some sort of agreement regulating what constitutes
a digital signature and the meaning of a signature, the definition of a third party
that can settle disputes, and additional functionality to bind actions to a point
in time (e.g. timestamps or a trusted deposit).
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Non-repudiation can be applied to various actions; for a multi-agent system,
non-repudiation of origin and non-repudiation of receipt are believed to be of
most relevance. Non-repudiation of origin protects against an originator’s false
denial of having created the content of a message and of having sent a mes-
sage [62]. Non-repudiation of receipt protects against a recipient’s false denial
of having received a message [62].
Confidentiality of communication
Confidentiality of communication is about ensuring that unauthorised parties
cannot access information in transit. For communication between agents ex-
ecuting on separate hosts, encryption is typically required for confidentiality
protection. As for integrity, confidentiality can be applied per message or per
session.
Anonymity
Anonymity services allow a user to perform actions without being tracked or
associated with a transaction. The possibility of anonymous transactions is
potentially an important factor for user acceptance.
5.3 Providing security functionality
In this section we will consider how the security functionality described previ-
ously in this chapter can be provided.
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5.3.1 Platform protection
Logical Access Control
The platform needs to protect itself and its hosted agents against unauthorised
access. Such functionality is often implemented in existing operating systems
and execution environments. It can, at least partially, be implemented by using
the concept of sandboxing and safe code interpretation (as described in sec-
tion 3.4.1), where executable code (e.g. an agent) would be able to do anything
within the sandbox while any actions involving resources outside the sandbox
are closely regulated and monitored. With this approach only limited efforts
need to be spent on ensuring the correctness of the received code.
However, using the sandbox technique alone does not address all the access con-
trol issues. In order to make full use of agents they need to be able to access
resources outside the sandbox. Resources outside the sandbox include resources
located on the same physical device as well as the ability to communicate with
other devices/hosts/agents. Also, even within the sandbox, code is using re-
sources, and hence access controls need to exist even when sandbox techniques
are employed.
We assume that the execution environment has a security policy that regulates
the requirements under which an access request will be granted. It is reason-
able to assume that an access control list (ACL) [49] in combination with a
capability-based scheme [49] will be required to provide the necessary access
control services. While ACLs are typically rather static in nature (although
there is nothing to stop dynamic changes to the list) a capability scheme allows
a subject to provide the required information at the point of an access request.
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A capability scheme based on public key cryptography and a PKI would allow
for the required delegation and transfer of rights between parties.
Authentication of foreign code
Use of the sandbox technique and safe code interpretation on their own can
only be used to limit agent access to local resources. This is not enough to
provide more powerful functionality. Applications will need to be given access
to resources that, if misused, can result in unauthorised actions. In recent years
research has been performed on proof carrying code (described in section 3.4.2).
This research aims to verify that a piece of code is secure before it begins
execution. However useful this would be, this is still very much an emerging
area, and it is not clear how feasible it would be to restrict agents to those
which have formal proofs of security. A more pragmatic approach is to trust a
particular piece of software because one decides to trust the developer/supplier
of the software. This technique is used in Java [86] as well as in MExE [1]. Using
this technique we need ways of verifying that a particular piece of software does
originate from a party we are prepared to trust, at least for the purposes of code
execution. This can be done through cryptographic means.
When an agent arrives at the execution environment it is handled by the mobil-
ity service. Here various security checks are made. The following information
associated with the agent can, for example, be verified and used by the mobil-
ity service, in conjunction with its own policy information, in order to decide
whether an agent should be granted execution rights:
• agent owner,
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• agent provider,
• policy information associated with the agent,
• required resources,
• submitting host,
• path history.
Event logging
Once audit data is generated it needs to be stored and properly protected.
Storage can be at the local platform but can also be sent to a trusted party
or other remote storage. If the security of the platform is compromised it can
potentially be valuable to have transferred the audit data prior to the attack.
This does of course generate network traffic and hence is not always the preferred
option.
Once audit data is generated and stored it can be analysed. The analysis can be
an automatic process e.g. looking for patterns or anomalies, or it can be carried
out manually, e.g. in the event of a security breach.
5.3.2 Agent protection
First note that certain aspects of agent protection, in particular focussing on
protecting the means for agents to create signatures and commit to transactions,
are considered in much greater detail in chapters 8 – 11.
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Access control
In order to protect an agent from other agents the logical access control mech-
anisms described in section 5.3.1 would apply. The problems involved when
trying to protect information existing on a device from a determined user who
has physical control over the device are non-trivial. One possible solution to
this problem is a protected chip; in the case of GSM and UMTS this takes the
form of a smart card [111]. The model used for deploying agents in an open
network setting should not require the use of such security measures but should
nevertheless allow them to be used.
Physically protected devices exist with various functionalities and with different
interfaces and formats. The simplest can only be used for protected storage
while more sophisticated also have processing capabilities. The complete agent
execution environment can in theory be implemented in a protected device.
More realistic, however, is to have a protected device with very limited storage
and processing power that can be used for critical information storage and
processing.
Agent authentication
Agents need the ability to authenticate each other, and to authenticate them-
selves towards an agent platform and service providers. As long as the host on
which the agent is executing is trusted not to misuse any authentication infor-
mation, existing authentication protocols can be used for this purpose. These
protocols can, for example, be based on shared secrets or public key cryptog-
raphy and can be implemented independently from the agent platform. In the
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case where the host that is executing the agent is not trusted with agent au-
thentication information, the solutions will greatly depend on the application.
Certain applications should probably not be implemented using mobile code
when the executing platform cannot be trusted.
Platform authentication
Once an agent is executing on a platform it is in theory too late to determine
if the platform is authentic or not. If it is a hostile platform, the platform can
trick the agent into executing anyway. However, by involving a Trusted Service
Provider (TSP), certain functionality to ensure that a host will act in an honest
manner can be provided. Platform authentication mechanisms similar to those
used for agents can be employed.
Authorisation
As for authentication, once an agent is executing on a platform it is in theory too
late to determine if the platform is authorised to execute the code or not. This
can potentially also be solved by involving a TSP that carries out authentication
and checks if the platform is authorised before giving the platform full access
to the executable code. Other possible solutions might involve cryptographic
approaches, where a host is required to possess the correct decryption key in
order to be able to interpret the code correctly.
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Secure agent mobility
Although mobility could be functionality built into an agent using standard
communication services, this is likely to prove too cumbersome. The execution
environment can therefore offer a mobility service.
An agent can carry code that should not be disclosed to an untrusted party. One
way to ensure that an agent and its payloads are not disclosed is to encrypt the
agent when in transit and ensure that the agent is only sent to trusted hosts.
The challenge is then to decide what constitutes a trusted host. The agent can
carry a list of hosts that are considered to be trusted. Alternatively, the agent
can carry a list of trusted Environment Certifiers (ECs), generated by a TSP
that vouches for the behaviour of the host (and its operator). A host would
then have to show, (e.g. produce a digital certificate and signature) that it is
certified. In both cases we trust that a trusted host would not let the agent
move to an environment that is not trusted.
The fundamental problem that a trusted host must be trusted not to disclose
the agent to an un-trusted party cannot be avoided. However, by involving
TSPs we can minimise the information sent to the trusted host and/or move
the decision whether a particular host should be trusted to the trusted party. In
any case, a host will need the means to be authenticated, be it authentication to
another host, an agent on another host, or even to an agent already executing
on the host.
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Agent communication
For communication between agents executing on separate hosts, encryption is
typically required for confidentiality protection. An agent can include the re-
quired functionality for encryption/decryption and its associated key manage-
ment functionality. This might be a desirable solution for certain applications.
However, for performance (and management) reasons it is more efficient to let
encryption/decryption be provided as a service by the agent’s execution envi-
ronment. Depending on the device, this might be implemented in software only,
but may also be assisted by special hardware. Similarly, integrity functionality
can be implemented within the agent, but it is likely to be more efficient when
realised as a service.
For communication between agents executing on the same host, confidentiality
and integrity of communication are assumed to be provided by the platform.
The platform needs to separate agents in such a way that information leak-
age and manipulation are prohibited. To further protect the communication
between agents on the same host would not make sense, since the party in
physical control of the host (who would be the only other potential threat) will
have direct access to agents anyway. If further protection is required physical
measures must be used.
Event Logging
Agents need the ability to generate audit trails that can be examined if needed.
How to handle such information for agents, and in particular for mobile agents,
is not straightforward; the following options are possible for a mobile agent:
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Store audit information in the agent’s payload. This would generate some extra
communication but would not necessarily require involvement of extra function-
ality or parties. The carried audit information can, however, be manipulated
and possibly accessed by hosts visited after generation. Cryptographic tech-
niques, such as those described in section 3.3.5, can be used to protect such
payloads. In such a case, additional computational resources would then be
required.
Store audit information at the host where it is generated. No extra network traf-
fic would be incurred but hosts would be relied upon to store the information for
a certain period. It might not be in the interest of the host to keep the informa-
tion. It could also potentially become cumbersome to retrieve the information
when needed if an agent’s audit trail is spread out over several hosts.
Send audit information to agents on other hosts. Multiple agents can be used in
cooperation in order to minimise the reliance on a single, possibly ill-behaved,
host. This approach will incur additional network traffic but no additional
infrastructure would be required.
Send audit information to a trusted service provider. Extra network traffic
would be generated and some sort of agreement must exist between the agent
owner and the TSP.
The approach chosen would depend on the application. An open MAS would
probably need to provide for all such solutions.
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Non-repudiation
A non-repudiation service can prove very valuable in a system where agents
are representing users in various scenarios. This can be provided through cryp-
tographic protocols that ensure one or more parties cannot later deny that a
certain transaction took place. This particular security feature can be split into
two separate problems, that of non-repudiation of origin and non-repudiation
of receipt. Non-repudiation services can help to make audit information more
credible and useful, and also to provide an infrastructure for binding contractual
agreements of various kinds.
Non-repudiation can be achieved using digital signatures and a supporting pub-
lic key infrastructure. It would be straightforward for an agent executing in
an environment controlled by the agent’s owner to produce non-repudiable ma-
terial. However, when an agent is executing on a device under someone else’s
control this becomes non-trivial. The executing host could then make the agent
produce a signature that would not have been produced if the agent was exe-
cuted properly. One partial solution to this problem is to also let the executing
host add a digital signature to the material. However, what such a signature
would achieve in practice is not clear. In case of a dispute it might not be
trivial to determine if the agent has been executed in a proper manner or not.
This solution would, however, allow the host on which the agent produced the
signature to be traced.
Further, it would be useful to distinguish between information that the host
understands and information that the host does not understand. For example,
a signature produced on some information provided by an agent could be used
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to show that the agent was executing on the host. However, it could not be used
to hold the host (or its owner) responsible for the signed content. On the other
hand, a host might, for example, be requested to sign information saying that
an agent is executing on the host at a particular time, in which case the host (or
its owner) should be accountable. In this case the host needs to ’understand’
what it is signing. A verifier must then also be able to distinguish between such
information.
A trusted service provider would need to be involved at some stage of a non-
repudiation protocol. It can simply act as a settling entity in case of disputes
or be involved in the actual production of non-repudiable material. A time
stamping service might also be required for certain non-repudiation material
(see section 6.5).
The agent security services would be able to generate signatures on the host’s
behalf. Such a signature could be produced at an agent’s request or automati-
cally as part of a protocol.
The means for agents to create non-repudiable commitments are considered in
much greater detail in chapters 8 – 11.
Anonymous execution
The agent based system can provide for anonymous execution by (1) allowing
execution of agents, without identification of the agent owner; and (2) by the
usage of proxy services that would allow a user to be traced only if the user or
her agents are misbehaving. This service can be provided in the network by a
service provider. It would be the security policy of a device that regulates if
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such agents and their transactions would be allowed onto the device.
5.3.3 Communication security services
This topic is covered in considerably more detail in chapters 6 and 7.
Authentication and integrity of communication
By digitally signing content, information can be linked to its signer. With a sup-
porting PKI, information can also be linked to parties without pre-established
relations. This is crucial functionality for provision of authentication in a scal-
able multi-agent system. A digital signature will also (if properly implemented)
provide integrity protection for the signed message.
An agent can be equipped with its own private key. Its signatures can then
be verified by anyone who can obtain a copy of the corresponding public key.
Likewise, agent platforms can be equipped with their own private keys to let
them produce digital signatures. If pre-established relationships exist, MACs
can be used instead. However, for mobile agents these techniques might prove
insufficient. Sections 6.3 and 6.4 further describe how authentication techniques
can be applied to agent communication.
Non-repudiation
Non-repudiation can be achieved by various means. The solution should, of
course, depend on the application of the non-repudiation service. A service
aimed at protecting transactions involving high monetary values can be allowed
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to have high transaction costs and delays, while these factors should be kept
to a minimum when very low value transactions are involved. For agent-based
middleware, a service supporting small value transactions is believed to be valu-
able. Although high value transactions should not be prohibited, these might
be better dealt with as an ‘application service’. Section 6.5 further describes
how a timestamping service can be used to provide a non-repudiation service in
a multi-agent environment.
Confidentiality of communication
For the application of agents, and particularly mobile agents, asymmetric cryp-
tography has some very useful properties. An agent sending a confidential mes-
sage does not need to carry a secret key. It can use the public key of the party
with which it communicates to encrypt the data – this then means that access
to an agent (and hence to the public key it carries) does not reveal messages
previously encrypted by that agent. Depending on the application, it might
be possible to give an agent the public key it needs to use for its communica-
tion. However, in a more dynamic scenario, agents need to be able to obtain
the public key of an arbitrary entity (perhaps within certain domains). By
using public key cryptography the problem of keeping the cryptographic keys
secret is removed. However, it is crucial to ensure the relationship between a
public key and the owner of its corresponding private key. Confidentiality of
communication is further developed in section 6.6.
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Anonymity
User anonymity can be achieved through various means. If an agent cannot be
traced to its owner through any of the information carried in its communication
the owner remains anonymous. However, it might be possible to trace a user
through the identity of an agent, in which case the agent identity would need to
be changed into one that cannot be traced to the user. This approach is further
developed in section 6.7.
5.4 Conclusions
In this section basic security functionality addressing the security of agents,
agent platforms, and agent communication has been identified. High level out-
lines of how these security features can be realised have also been given. This
provides a context for the more specific discussions making up the remainder of
this thesis.
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This chapter describes, within the context of the security model presented in
chapter 4, how agent communications security can be provided in a MAS.
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6.1 Introduction
An agent’s ability to communicate is fundamental and essential for it to function
in a multi-agent system. In this chapter we describe how secure communication
between agents on different platforms can be addressed within a multi-agent
system in general, as well as within the security architecture presented in chap-
ter 4. The basic cryptographic tools used to provide secure communications,
as well as the notation used in this chapter have been described in section 1.4.
The security services for agent communication and their motivation have been
described in section 5.2.3.
Section 6.2 points out some architectural issues. Sections6.3 to 6.7 respectively
describe how specific security services, namely data origin authentication, en-
tity authentication, non-repudiation, confidentiality, and anonymity can be pro-
vided. Finally, the conclusions of this chapter are presented in section 6.8.
6.2 Architectural issues
In this section we will consider in general terms where security services can
be implemented and how the architecture presented in chapter 4 can support
secure agent communication.
There are two main options for the location of secure communication services.
One option is for the agents themselves to directly implement security services.
This approach is rather independent from the architecture and the functionality
offered by the execution platform, allowing the developer to make choices as to
how security services are implemented and used.
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The other option is to place security services within the execution platform as
services to communicating agents. In order to make the system scalable and
manageable we believe that security services should be implemented as part of
the architecture on the execution platform. However, this should be done in
such a way that the first option is not prevented (although preventing agents
providing security services is probably not something that can easily be enforced
by the platform).
The security architecture described in chapter 4 contains entities and compo-
nents that will facilitate secure agent communication. Of the involved parties
the trust service provider (TSP) is of particular importance for establishing se-
cure communications, but other entities may also be involved. One role for a
TSP is to act as a CA issuing digital certificates.
In the agent execution environment architecture (see chapter 4), the agent secu-
rity services and agent communication services are the main elements involved
in the provision of secure communication.
A subscription module can also be used to facilitate secure communication. This
is assumed to be a small tamper proof module (e.g. a smart card) provided by a
service provider. Such a device can be used for protected (agent) execution and
protected storage of various information (including private and secret keys).
6.3 Data origin authentication
In this section we will describe how, and to what degree, data origin authentica-
tion can be provided, first for stationary (i.e. non-mobile) agents (section 6.3.1),
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and then for mobile agents (section 6.3.2).
We will use the following scenario to illustrate the message exchanges (see fig-
ure 6.1). Agent Q, residing on platform P1, needs to send a message to agent
R, residing on platform P2. R requires assurance that the message originates
from Q.
Platform P1
Agent
Q
Platform P2
Agent
R
Figure 6.1: Agent Q sending a message to agent R
Whether authentication and integrity should be provided between agents (Q-R),
between agent and platform (Q-P2), or between platforms (P1-P2) should not
be dictated by the system. This will be an application decision which is likely
to differ depending on the nature of the application and the capability of the
platforms for which the application is intended.
6.3.1 Stationary agents
The simplest solution involves Q sending a signed message to R as follows.
Q → R : m‖sQ(m)
Of course, this solution requires Q to have its own signature key pair, and
R to have a trusted copy of Q’s public signature verification key. This latter
property can, for example, be achieved by transferring a public key certificate
for the necessary public key, signed by a mutually trusted CA.
Alternatively, if agent Q and agent R have a pre-established relationship in the
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form of a shared secret (K1), a MAC can be used instead. The computation of a
MAC is generally less computationally intensive than that of a digital signature.
In a scenario where an agent is frequently communicating with the same agent
(or agents), this can be a more efficient solution.
Q → R : m‖MACK1(m)
If an agent is executing on a host that is trusted and the agent’s secrets (e.g.
cryptographic keys) have not been compromised, the above protocols are enough
to ensure data origin. However, in the case where it is possible that the agent’s
key has been compromised, the executing host can also add its digital signature.
This would prevent a party who has obtained the agent’s key from impersonating
the agent in an undetectable fashion. It can also serve to bind the executing
platform to certain actions.
Q → R : m‖sQ(m)‖sP1(m‖sQ(m))
Or alternatively, if shared secrets exist
Q → R : m‖MACK1(m)‖MACK2(m‖MACK1(m))
where K1 is a secret shared between Q and R, and K2 is a secret shared between
P1 and R.
Combinations of digital signatures and MACs are, of course, also possible.
The above protocols do not protect against message deletion, duplication, or
delay attacks. To protect against message duplication and message deletion the
message m should be constructed to also include the intended recipient and
a freshness value. Freshness values usually take the form of a timestamp or a
nonce (number used once). Clock based timestamps require synchronised clocks
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which would probably be infeasible to provide securely for all the platforms in
our system.
That is, we should use a construction of the following form:
m = m1‖RID‖nonce
where m1 is the original message, RID is the identity of the recipient, and nonce
is a unique message number. The nonce must be supplied by the recipient;
alternatively sequence numbers can be used which must be maintained by both
sender and recipient.
General mechanisms using MACs for entity authentication are further described
in [75], and general mechanisms using digital signatures for entity authentication
are further described in [74].
To protect against delay attacks, timestamps or a challenge-response protocol
(see section 6.4) would be required.
6.3.2 Mobile agents
For mobile agents, the above protocols can be insufficient even if platforms are
required to add their signatures. An agent platform, on which the agent has
previously (legally) executed, can at a later time still produce a valid agent
signature. (Perhaps we have decided that we trust the platform not to perform
such an attack when sending the agent there, in which case no further measures
would be necessary).
Figure 6.2 shows the path of a multi-hop agent, moving from its original platform
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Figure 6.2: Movement of a mobile agent
(P0), the ‘agent home’, to platforms P1, P2, . . . and finally to Pn before returning
to, or sending a final message to, the ‘agent home’ P0. The ‘agent home’ is the
agent’s origin and is assumed to be fully trusted by the agent (and its owner).
This could, for example, be a user’s mobile terminal. If the protocols described
in section 6.3.1 are used, any platform from P1 to Pn would be able to produce
a valid signature simply by extracting the agent’s cryptographic key and using
it to sign a message.
We will now describe some partial solutions to this problem. They are not
complete solutions since they introduce new, sometimes significant, constraints
or communication overheads and will not suit every situation.
Avoiding multi-hop agents
A partial solution to this problem, but with likely significant increased complex-
ity, is to only use single-hop agents or to make the agent visit a trusted services
provider between every visited platform.
By making the agent return to the ‘agent home’ between every move, as shown
in figure 6.3, the need to use the same secret or private key on more than one
platform can be avoided by updating the agent’s key every time it leaves P0.
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Figure 6.3: Deployment of multiple one-hop agents
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Figure 6.4: Using trusted platforms to update the agent’s key
Figure 6.4 shows how trusted platforms can be inserted in the path and used to
update the agent’s key (or any other information that should not be unneces-
sarily exposed). The trusted platforms would be run by a TSP. Depending on
the application an agent might visit more than one platform before it needs to
move to a trusted platform in order to obtain a new signature key.
Undetachable signatures
Another (partial) solution is to associate a signature key with certain con-
straints. Sander and Tschudin proposed one such scheme in [98], which they
refer to as an undetachable signature. This was described in more detail in sec-
tion 3.3.10. This prevents signatures form being applied to arbitrary messages.
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Restricting signatures through digital certificates
An alternative to undetachable signatures is to use public key certificates to reg-
ulate the validity of digital signatures. Public key certificates are used to link an
identity with a public verification key by which a verifier can check the validity
of a digital signature. Certificates usually include a validity period under which
valid signatures can be produced. By extending the constraints included in the
certificate to context-related values such as executing host, maximum value of a
purchase, and so on, certificates can be used to further restrict the use of signa-
ture keys and thereby decrease the risks involving improper use of the signature
key. One advantage with this scheme over undetachable signatures is that it
relies on already well-established cryptographic techniques. This approach is
further described in chapter 8.
Distributing trust among multiple platforms
By using threshold signatures we can deploy agents in such a way that a single
compromised platform or agent will not compromise the security of the scheme.
The scheme can be tailored in such a way that a number of agents can be
compromised without compromising the scheme.
The idea of a threshold scheme is to take a secret, and divide it into pieces
called shares which are distributed among a group of entities. Then any subset
of these entities of a given size can reconstruct this secret, but a smaller group
can learn no information about the secret. An example of such a scheme is given
in [102].
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Threshold cryptography was first proposed by Desmedt [33]. One important
type of threshold cryptosystem is known as a threshold signature. In such a
scheme, any set of k parties from a total of l parties can sign a document,
whereas any coalition of less than k parties cannot. Such schemes tend to rely
on a combiner which is not necessarily trusted. Several schemes have been
proposed based on both ElGamal and RSA signatures (see, for example, [103]
for a short survey). Recently Shoup [103] proposed an RSA-based scheme which
is as efficient as possible; the scheme uses only one level of secret sharing, each
server sends a single part signature to a combiner, and must do work that
is equivalent, up to a constant factor, to computing a single RSA signature.
Although not perfect as a threshold signature scheme (as it relies on a trusted
party to form the shares) this scheme is ideal in a mobile agent setting, where
the user would be responsible for generating the shares for his agents.
By combining undetachable signatures and threshold signatures, we can achieve
undetachable threshold signatures. The construction of such a scheme is de-
scribed in chapter 11.
An alternative to using threshold signatures is to generate unique signature
keys for a number of agents and accompany these with public key certificates.
Encoded in the certificates is also a threshold value. In order for a verifier to
produce a valid signature a number of ‘agent-signatures’ meeting the thresh-
old value must be collected. This scheme is further described, along with its
practical advantages, in chapter 10.
A different approach, which also avoids complete trust in one execution en-
vironment, is to use cooperating agents. While one agent might reside on a
platform where the main processing is carried out, other agents residing and ex-
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ecuting on other platforms can carry sensitive or important information which
is only released to the first agent once certain conditions have been fulfilled.
This approach assumes that the platforms carrying the different agents will not
cooperate, an assumption which is reasonable for our envisioned system. Such
protocols have been proposed by Roth [96].
Hiding signature key from executing hosts
If the ability to produce a signature can be incorporated into the agent in such
a way that a malicious platform cannot misuse this information, the problem of
agent authentication would have been solved.
Techniques have been invented to hide information or execution code even from
an executing host. Environmental key generation, computing with encrypted
functions, and obfuscated code are all examples of such techniques – for details
see sections 3.3.7, 3.3.8, and 3.3.9. In the case of environmental key generation
the agent’s private signature key would be held encrypted and only revealed
if certain conditions are met. In the case of obfuscated code, it is the private
signature key that would be embedded in scrambled form.
6.4 Entity authentication
In this section we will look at how entity authentication can be achieved.
The same mechanisms used to support data origin authentication can be used for
entity authentication. Entity authentication can be unilateral or mutual. As for
message authentication, asymmetric or symmetric cryptographic mechanisms
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can be used. If no pre-established secret exist between the agents, public-key
cryptography can be used in combination with a public key infrastructure to
facilitate authentication. For agents with regular communication, mechanisms
not requiring public-key cryptography might be preferable as they are likely to
be less computationally intensive.
As in section 6.3, we suppose that agent Q, residing on platform P1, needs to
authenticate itself towards agent R, residing on platform P2 (see figure 6.1).
Below is an example of a mutual authentication protocol using digital signa-
tures [74].
Q → R : NQ
R → Q : NR‖sR(NR‖NQ‖QID)
Q → R : sQ(NQ‖NR‖RID)
where NQ and NR are nonces, QID and RID are the identities of Q and R
respectively.
As for origin authentication (section 6.3) an application may also wish to au-
thenticate the originating platform. This can be achieved by also letting the
platform add its signature as follows.
Q → R : NQ
R → Q : NR‖sR(NR‖NQ‖QID)‖sP2(NR‖sR(NR‖NQ‖QID))
Q → R : sQ(NQ‖NR‖RID)‖sP1(sQ(NQ‖NR‖RID))
For mobile agents, as in the origin authentication case, multi-hop agents can
be avoided (see section 6.3.2) in order to eliminate misuse of the agent’s keys.
The process of restricting the scope of signatures through digital certificates can
104
6. Agent communication security
also be applied to the entity authentication case. However, of the mechanisms
described in section 6.3.2, undetachable signatures and distributing trust among
multiple platforms do not appear to be applicable to entity authentication for
mobile agents.
6.4.1 Architecture support for authentication
In this section we will consider how the security architecture can support and
facilitate authentication.
As stated above (in section 6.2), agents can include all the functionality they
need, including that necessary to support entity authentication. It is also pos-
sible to build applications independent of the supporting security architecture.
However, by providing security services to agents, a more efficient and manage-
able solution is accomplished.
An agent can request the execution platform to verify authentication informa-
tion and be returned a success or failure message and, if requested, some sort of
receipt that can be stored in a log or sent to a trusted platform for safe storage
in case of future disputes.
If the executing platform does not have the certificates, or other supporting
information, required for validating the information it can contact a trusted
service provider offering this service.
In a highly distributed environment, certificates and certificate revocation in-
formation will be generated, maintained, and stored in various places. It is also
likely that, for performance reasons, such information will be cached in various
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places in the infrastructure. An agent should therefore also be able to express
various degrees of assurance in authentication verification when requesting ser-
vices from the platform.
A subscription module can be used as protected storage and facilitate distribu-
tion of root certificates and shared secrets. The subscription module can also be
used to protect processing involving these secrets, thereby minimising the risk
that they are misused by an adversary.
6.5 Non-repudiation
As mentioned earlier (in section 2.3.4), one can distinguish non-repudiation of
many actions. Generic protocols for non-repudiation services have been specified
in a series of ISO standards [62, 63, 64]. In this section we will outline a simple
non-repudiation of origin service applicable in an agent context.
The simplest form of non-repudiation protocol is to use digital signatures as
described in section 6.3.1. Some kind of agreement would need to exist in order
to be able to settle disputes at a later point in time. One major problem with
such a protocol is the absence of any indication of time in the message. If
accurate clocks are available at the point of the message creation, the time can
be included in the message. To provide accurate clocks is a non-trivial task,
and a possible point of attack; one way of addressing this is through the use of
a TSP, as proposed immediately below.
A simple non-repudiation service can be achieved as an extension to the au-
thentication protocols given in section 6.3.1. A TSP can offer a non-repudiation
106
6. Agent communication security
service simply by offering a timestamp and forward service;
(M1) Q → T : RID‖m‖sQ(RID‖m)
(M2) T → R : m‖sQ(RID‖m)‖TIME‖sT (m‖sQ(RID‖m)‖TIME)
where TIME is the time of the transaction. The recipient’s identity is included
in the first message to indicate to whom T should forward the message. For the
protocol to work, the two communicating entities (agents, platforms, etc.) need
to be able to communicate with a TSP offering the service. The protocol further
requires both communicating parties to trust the same TSP for the service.
The protocol can be extended to offer non-repudiation of delivery by requesting
the recipient (R) to send a signed reply, either directly to the sender (Q) or
through the trusted service provider in the same manner as the protocol just
described.
More sophisticated protocols have been proposed that can be used also in an
agent context to achieve non-repudiation. Examples include protocols proposed
for certified e-mail, see e.g. [3, 88]. An attractive property of the protocol
proposed in [88] is that a trusted third party only needs to be involved when
the protocol is failing.
Platform P1
Agent
Q
TSP
TM1
Platform P2
Agent
R
M2
Figure 6.5: TSP offering a timestamp and forward service
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6.5.1 Architecture support for non-repudiation
The protocol described above requires the support of a trusted service provider
to timestamp and forward messages. This can be implemented as part of the
middleware. Users might get access to the service and ‘agree to trust’ the TSP
simply by having a contract with their home service provider (other business
models are also possible). A supporting micropayment scheme could be used to
charge for the service. If more sophisticated protocols are required for certain
applications, e.g. for high value transactions, this might be better implemented
as an application service above a middleware layer.
6.6 Confidentiality of communication
In this section we will describe how confidentiality of communication can be
achieved. For communication between agents executing on separate hosts, en-
cryption is required for confidentiality protection.
Platform P1
Agent
Q
Platform P2
Agent
R
Figure 6.6: Agent Q sending a message to agent R
Q can simply, before sending the message to R, encrypt the message using R’s
public key as follows.
Q → R : ER(m)
Only R will then be able to decrypt the message using the corresponding pri-
vate key.
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If agent Q and agent R have a pre-established relationship in the form of a
shared secret, symmetric cryptography can be used instead. Symmetric encryp-
tion/decryption is in general less computationally intensive than corresponding
asymmetric operations. Again, in a scenario where an agent is frequently com-
municating with the same agent (or agents), this can be a more efficient solution.
That is, we have:
Q → R : EK1(m)
where K1 is a shared secret between Q and R. Since asymmetric cryptography
has advantages when it comes to key distribution, and symmetric key cryp-
tography has efficiency advantages, it is common to use a combination of the
two, i.e.
Q → R : ER(K)‖EK(m)
where ER(K) is a secret key K encrypted using R’s public key. The secret key
K is then used to encrypt the message.
The same mechanisms can be used to initialise a protected session. Alterna-
tively, and perhaps more likely to be implemented in a real system, the TLS
protocol [35] can be used, where TLS is a standardised protocol for initialising
and encrypting a session [28]. TLS also supports unilateral or mutual authen-
tication of the communicating parties.
To achieve traffic flow confidentiality at the communication layer where agent
communication takes place, traffic padding can be used. Agents would then
generate dummy traffic in order to hide the real communication that is taking
place. Depending on the threat scenario, it might be enough to generate dummy
traffic between two communicating agents (hiding real communication time and
frequency), or agents can send dummy traffic to multiple agents in order to
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conceal the real recipient.
6.6.1 Architecture support for confidentiality
In this section we will consider how the security architecture can support and
facilitate confidentiality of communication.
Like the functionality supporting integrity, the security architecture can help in
finding, retrieving, and verifying public key certificates for agents. Further, the
executing platform can provide local agents with encryption and decryption of
messages as well as entire sessions.
As for authentication support, the subscription module can be used for storage
and distribution of root public keys.
6.7 Anonymity
In this section we describe how anonymity can be offered within the multi-agent
system.
The possibility of anonymous transactions is potentially an important factor for
user acceptance. Agents are in many ways ideal for providing anonymity to their
owners as they are independent entities, possessing some degree of autonomy,
and do not require direct user interaction. The agent based system can, for
example, provide for this by (1) allowing communication with, and execution
of, agents not carrying the identity of the agent owner, and (2) by the use of
proxy services that would allow a user to be traced only if the user or her agents
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are misbehaving. This service can be provided in the network by a service
provider. It would be the security policy of a device that regulates whether or
not such agents and their transactions would be allowed onto the device.
We will now use the FIPA protocol, further described in chapter 7, to outline how
anonymity can be provided to agent communication through a proxy service.
A FIPA message envelope carries, amongst other information, the parameters
to and from, indicating the identity of the intended recipient and the identity
of the originating agent in the format: agent@host.com.
The from parameter is mandatory but can be changed to one that does not
reveal the agent’s true identity or the host on which the agent is running. This
would provide anonymity to the agent as well as to its owner. However, if the
parameter is used for replies, then the use of an arbitrary agent identity will
prevent replies being delivered. One should also be aware that an underlying
transport services might reveal the physical address of such a message (e.g. the
platform’s IP address).
A proxy service would remove these problems. Suppose that agent Q, residing
on platform P1, needs to send an anonymous message to agent R, residing on
platform P2, to which R should be able to reply. A proxy service (PS) can then
be used as follows, and as shown in figure 6.7.
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Figure 6.7: Proxy service giving anonymity
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(M1) Q → PS : from : Q@P1‖to : PS‖xto : R@P2
(M2) PS → R : from : A@PS‖to : R@P2
(M3) R → PS : from : R@P2‖to : A@PS
(M4) PS → Q : from : PS‖to : Q@P1‖xfrom : R@P2
In message (M1) indicates xto to whom PS shall forward the message and in
message (M4) indicates xfrom who originally sent the message.
The protocol, which works in a similar way to established Internet mail remail-
ers1, does require more messages than the standard non-anonymous version, and
requires access to the proxy service. The agent’s identity is only kept secret from
P2 and R, not from the proxy service. Hence, depending on the application, the
proxy service might also be required to be trusted (to various degrees).
By using mixes, as first proposed by Chaum [24] or one of its variants, e.g.
[51, 77, 105], the level of anonymity can be further enhanced. A network of
mixes can, in combination with cryptography, be used to split, and route, a
message through a network to its recipient, in such a way that any single mix-
node, an intercepter, or the recipient cannot identify the initiator. The recipient
can still use the same path through the mix-network to route a replay to the
initiator; this is achieved by assigning unique identifiers to individual message
transfers between mix-nodes, that can be used to route a reply back to the
initiator.
1See: http://www.andrebacard.com/remail.html for general information on Internet mail
remailers.
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6.7.1 Architecture support for anonymity
The proxy anonymity service can be provided as part of a middleware layer. It
can be operated by a TSP who has a relationship with the agent owner and, if
required, can provide certain assurance regarding the behaviour and actions of
the agent. If the agent is mobile the agent’s identity (or the owner’s identity)
would be exchanged for a proxy identity. For a communicating agent (mobile
or stationary) the proxy service would forward messages to their real owners.
If necessary, and if such a function is supported by the TSP, the proxy solution
can also be used to trace the real owner.
6.8 Conclusions
In this chapter we have shown how security protocols can be used to provide
secure communication within an agent-based system. Data integrity, data ori-
gin authentication, entity authentication, non-repudiation, confidentiality, and
anonymity can all be provided for the communication.
For mobile agents it is a non-trivial task to ensure that communication originat-
ing from the agent cannot be spoofed. Several techniques to limit the threats
posed to mobile agent communication exist. Nevertheless, mobile agents must
be deployed with great care if the authenticity of the communication is of im-
portance.
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This chapter evaluates the FIPA agent communication protocols and outlines
how security functions can be added.
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7.1 Introduction
FIPA1 is a non-profit organisation promoting the use and development of in-
telligent agents by openly developing specifications supporting interoperability
among agents and agent-based applications. FIPA’s specification for agent com-
munication has become a de facto standard. Although earlier, today obsolete,
FIPA specifications did consider security for agent communication [41, 43], se-
curity is not covered in the current specifications [44]. It appears that the FIPA
specifications and the general state of agent research are now mature enough
to require security services for agent communication. FIPA has recognised the
need for improved security and initiated work in the area2. Most of the work
described in this chapter has been previously published in [13].
In this chapter we will evaluate the FIPA specifications from a security point
of view and propose extensions to the specifications in order to provide security
services for agent communication. We will address the following security services
for agent message communication:
• Integrity, protects against improper modification of a message.
• Origin authentication, the corroboration that the source of data re-
ceived is as claimed.
• Confidentiality, guarantees that unauthorised parties cannot access in-
formation in transit.
Non-repudiation, which can be considered as a stronger version of origin au-
1Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents, see http://www.fipa.org
2See http://www2.elec.qmul.ac.uk/~stefan/fipa-security for the state and progress of
this work.
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thentication, will not be further addressed in this chapter. Non-repudiation (of
data origin and data reception) can be achieved using authentication mecha-
nisms in combination with timestamps and a third party to settle disputes (as
described in section 6.5).
We are still assuming a multi-agent system in an open environment, that is,
a system where no single authority is in control of the system, which means
that agents (and other entities) cannot be assumed to act in a perfectly honest
manner. We are also assuming the existence of a supporting Public Key In-
frastructure (PKI) for management of certified cryptographic public keys. The
precise requirements for a PKI for an open multi-agent system is a research
topic in itself.
The chapter is structured as follows. In the next two sections we briefly describe
the FIPA agent communication specifications, first the communication model
and then the message structure. Section 7.4 describes the Open PGP message
format and how this can be applied to agent communication. In section 7.5
we consider the required interaction between an agent and its platform if the
platform is to provide secure communications services to the agent. Finally,
section 7.6 gives the conclusions of this chapter.
7.2 The FIPA communication model
Figure 7.1 shows the FIPA message transport reference model [44].
The message transport service is a service typically provided by the agent plat-
form on which an agent is executing. However the agent and the message
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Figure 7.1: FIPA message transport model
transport service do not have to be located on the same host. The message
transportation service supports the transportation of messages between agents
on any given agent platform and between agents on different platforms through
the provision of an Agent Communication Channel (ACC). FIPA recognises
three options for an agent when sending a message to another agent residing on
a remote platform (illustrated in figure 7.2) [44].
1. Agent A sends the message to its local ACC using a proprietary or stan-
dard interface. The ACC then takes care of the transmission of the mes-
sage to the correct remote ACC. The remote ACC will then eventually
deliver the message.
2. Agent A sends the message directly to the ACC on the remote agent
platform on which B resides. This remote ACC then delivers the message
to B.
3. Agent A sends the message directly to agent B, using a direct communi-
cation mechanism. The message transfer, including buffering of messages
and any error messages, must be handled by the sending and receiving
agents. (No further specification for this communication mode is covered
by FIPA.)
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Figure 7.2: Methods of communication between agents on different platforms
7.3 FIPA Message structure
In this section we will describe the structure of a FIPA message [44] and then
consider how security is addressed.
A message is made up of a message envelope, containing transport informa-
tion, and a message body comprising of the agent communication data or ACL
(Agent Communication Language) message. Table 7.1 shows the structure of
the message envelope. An ACC should deliver the whole message, including the
message envelope, to the receiving agent. However, it is possible for agent plat-
forms to provide middleware layers to free agents from the task of processing
the envelope [44].
Table 7.1: Message envelope description
Parameter Description
to Names of primary recipients of the message, mandatory.
from Name of the agent who sent the message, mandatory.
comments Optional comment.
acl-representation Name of the syntax representation of the message body,
mandatory.
payload-length The length of the message body, optional.
payload-encoding The language encoding of the message body, optional.
date Message creation date and time, mandatory.
intended-receiver The name of the agent to whom this instance of a mes-
sage is to be delivered, optional.
received Time received by an ACC, optional.
transport-behaviour Transport requirements of the message, optional.
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A earlier, now obsolete, version of the message transport service specification [43]
contained an optional envelope parameter called encrypted. If used, the field
indicates that the message is encrypted as defined in IETF RFC 822 [31]. The
syntax for the parameter is two words. The first word indicates the software
used to encrypt the body, and the second, optional, word is intended to aid the
recipient in selecting the proper decryption key. Current FIPA platforms based
on JADE (Java Agent DEvelopment Framework) [6], FIPA-OS [91], etc., do not
support this field.
Table 7.2 shows the structure of an ACL message. The performative element is
the only mandatory element of an ACL message; all other elements are optional.
The ACL message structure does not include any security specific elements.
Table 7.2: ACL message elements
Element Description
performative The type of communicative act of the message.
sender Name of the agent who sent the message, mandatory.
receiver Names of primary recipients of the message, mandatory.
reply-to Indicates that subsequent messages in this conversation
are to be directed to the agent named in this element.
content Denotes the content of the message.
language Denotes the language in which the content element is
expressed.
encoding Denotes the specific encoding of the content language
expression.
ontology Denotes the ontology used to give a meaning to the sym-
bols in the content expression.
protocol Denotes the interaction protocol that the sending agent
is employing with this message.
conversation-id Used to identify the ongoing sequence of communicative
acts that together form a conversation.
reply-with Introduces an expression that will be used by the re-
sponding agent to identify this message.
in-reply-to Denotes an expression that references an earlier action
to which this message is a reply.
reply-by Denotes a time which indicates the latest time by which
the sending agent would like to have the reply.
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7.3.1 Security evaluation
The current FIPA message specifications do not provide any security services.
However, the presided version of the standard [43] had limited provision for
security through the envelope primitive encrypted. This allows for additional
software to be used to offer message confidentiality through encryption. Ori-
gin authentication and message integrity are not supported. Furthermore, the
encrypted field in the envelope is intended for the ACC, not the agent itself,
which means that the encryption would be under the control of the ACC, not
the agent.
7.4 Open PGP
In this section we will briefly describe the Open PGP message structure in order
to be able to evaluate its appropriateness for FIPA messages.
Open PGP [22] is a non-proprietary protocol for protecting email using public
key cryptography. It is based on PGP as originally developed by Phil Zimmer-
mann [121]. The Open PGP protocol defines standard formats for encrypted
messages, signatures, and certificates for exchanging public keys. Over the past
decade, PGP, and more recently Open PGP, have become well used de facto
standards for encrypted email. By becoming an IETF standard [22], Open PGP
may be implemented freely.
PGP messages are constructed from a number of records referred to as packets.
A packet is a piece of data that has a tag specifying its meaning. A PGP
message consists of a number of packets. Some of those packets may themselves
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contain other packets. Each packet consists of a packet header, followed by the
packet body. The packet header has a tag which denotes what type of packets
the body holds. Table 7.3 shows the defined tags.
Table 7.3: Open PGP packet types
Tag no. Description
0 Reserved - a packet tag must not have this value
1 Public-Key Encrypted Session Key Packet
2 Signature Packet
3 Symmetric-Key Encrypted Session Key Packet
4 One-Pass Signature Packet
5 Secret Key Packet
6 Public Key Packet
7 Secret Subkey Packet
8 Compressed Data Packet
9 Symmetrically Encrypted Data Packet
10 Marker Packet
11 Literal Data Packet
12 Trust Packet
As can be seen from Table 7.3, PGP supports the secure message services de-
scribed in section 7.1, including message confidentiality, through the use of
symmetric and asymmetric encryption algorithms, and message integrity and
origin authentication, through the use of digital signatures.
Some of the PGP packets listed in the table are designed for key management.
This is functionality we have not considered, but which is crucial for deployment
of cryptography on a large scale.
PGP is not the only standard for describing cryptographically protected mes-
sage content. Another example is Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) (RFC
3369) [58]. CMS is used by S/MIME (Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Ex-
tensions) [93] and specifies syntax for representing digitally signed, hashed, au-
thenticated, or encrypted arbitrary message content (CMS is based on PKCS
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#7 [97]). Similar functionality to that described for Open PGP is available in
CMS.
7.4.1 Using PGP for FIPA messages
We will now consider how the PGP message structures can be used with FIPA
messages.
PGP can be used to encrypt and sign the entire ACL message without making
any changes to the message envelope. This would leave the agent to take care of
the encoding and decoding of PGP structured messages. This would not require
any changes to the FIPA specifications, assuming the agent is able to determine
if a message is PGP encoded or not (this might, for example, be achieved by
using the encoding field).
If there are reasons for treating the elements within the ACL differently, for
example to only encrypt or sign certain elements, additional information would
need to be provided to the agent to indicate how the message should be pro-
cessed.
If the ACC service is to perform encryption/decryption and process signatures
‘seamlessly’, additional information needs to be provided in the message enve-
lope.
The advantage with using an existing standardised protocol such as Open PGP
or CMS is that it is already defined, thereby avoiding duplication of work. The
drawback might be that the already standardised protocol has features unnec-
essary for our purposes, possibly adding unnecessary payloads and, perhaps,
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confusion.
To summarise, it is rather straightforward to make use of the Open PGP message
structure for FIPA agent communication. However, in order to allow for all the
communication modes described in section 7.2, as well as for cryptographically
protected messages, the specifications should allow encryption/decryption and
signature processing to be carried out by the ACC service as well as by the
agent. This would require additional information to be added in the message
envelope. For full flexibility, the ACL message should also carry information
describing the security mechanisms applied to the message. The information
exchange between an agent and ACC service is further described in the next
section.
7.5 Agent — platform interaction
In this section we consider further where the communication security mecha-
nisms fit in the FIPA architecture. We will also highlight architectural issues not
covered in the previous sections, namely key management and security policies.
Leaving the complete coding and encoding of encrypted or signed messages
to the agent may not always be desirable. To keep agents simple and small,
it can be more efficient to let the executing host deal with this potentially
complex task. This can be done in different ways, as described in the next two
paragraphs.
As shown in figure 7.3, one way is to let the agent receive the message as usual,
and when the agent has determined that it is an encrypted or signed message,
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it forwards the message to the appropriate service to decrypt it or to verify
the signature. The agent would then be returned the decrypted message or
an indication of the outcome of the signature verification. Similarly when the
agent wants to send an encrypted message or a signed message it would send
the message to the appropriate service and be returned the processed message,
which now can be sent as usual.
Agent Platform
ACC
AgentAgent SecurityServices
1
3
4
2
Figure 7.3: Security services separated from ACC
A second option, depicted in figure 7.4, would be to let the ACC intercept the
communication and offer the security services in a more transparent way to
the agent. This would require the ACC to be able to determine if incoming
communication is encrypted or signed, as well as getting an indication from the
agent whether encryption or signing should be done before sending the message.
Agent Platform
ACC
AgentAgent SecurityServices
1 4
2 3
Figure 7.4: Secure communication services offered ‘transparently’ to agents
Both modes of operation should be provided to ensure that the communication
modes described in section 7.2 are fully supported.
There are two important, and non-trivial, issues we have not yet covered. One
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is key management. When encryption is used the encryption/decryption keys
need to be managed. For asymmetric cryptography a PKI is typically used
to facilitate certain aspects of the key management. In a multi-agent system
various key management issues arise due to the fact that the agent executes on
a host which, in theory, has full control over the agent, even more so if the agent
depends on the host to carry out processing involving cryptographic keys. The
following questions need to be considered:
• Is the agent in control of its own key, or is this completely/partly delegated
to the platform where the agent is executing?
• Does the agent need its own keys, or can agents on the same host use the
same cryptographic keys?
Since applications will have different requirements we believe that agents should
have the freedom to decide on these issues themselves. This requires the archi-
tecture to support both the above approaches.
The second important thing we have not yet discussed is that of security policies.
If an agent depends on the host to perform cryptographic tasks, the agent needs
to communicate its requirements to the host. Likewise the host needs to let the
agent know certain information about its processing.
While PGP might be sufficient for the transport of encrypted and signed mes-
sages, further specifications need to be developed for a complete solution. Com-
munications between the agent and the executing host need to be standardised
to cover the transfer of key management and security policy data. In the re-
mainder of this section we consider the information that needs to be exchanged
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between an agent and the ACC service, which we assume is residing on the
platform where the agent is executing.
For outgoing communication (communication originating from the agent) the
agent needs to be able to supply (explicitly or implicitly) the platform with the
following instructions relating to the processing of the message being sent:
• Request message encryption.
• Supply an encryption key or indicate that the platform’s encryption key
should be used.
• Specify the choice of encryption algorithm (and other possible algorithm
related options, including key length, padding, etc.).
• Request message signing.
• Supply a signature key or indicate that the platform’s signature key should
be used.
• Specify the choice of signature algorithm (and possible algorithm related
options, including key length, padding, etc.).
If an agent requests encryption or signing, the platform would typically apply
default values for parameters not specified by the agent.
For incoming communication (communication destined for the agent) the plat-
form needs to be able to inform the agent regarding the following aspects of the
security processing of a received message:
• If the message was protected through encryption during transit.
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• If the message was encrypted, indicate the method of encryption that was
applied to the message (e.g. encryption algorithm and key length).
• If the message carried a digital signature.
• If the message was signed, to what extent the signature and the public
key (i.e. the certificate chain) have been verified.
The platform might need certain information from the agent in order to decrypt
a message or verify a signature, including the following:
• the decryption key,
• the identities of the trusted Certification Authorities (CAs) and agents,
• the signature verification requirements (e.g. verification against revocation
lists and maximum permitted length of certification chains).
The above information can be exchanged between the agent and platform in
various ways. The most straightforward way appears to be to let the agent
supply message specific information with every message that is passed to the
ACC service. Another option, which may be more efficient, is for the agent
to have a complete security policy description that can be passed to the ACC
service prior to any other communication taking place. Such a policy should be
allowed to be as complex as might be required. Different requirements might,
for example, apply depending on the destination of a message. A third option
is to combine the other two options. An agent can then carry, and supply to
the platform, a complete communication security policy, but can also request
a particular message treated differently by supplying specific information with
the message.
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7.6 Conclusions
The FIPA agent communication specifications are lacking sufficient functionality
to provide secure communication. By using an existing message structure such
as the Open PGP message format, sufficient protection can be achieved for the
communication. We have considered where security services can be applied to
agent communication within the FIPA architecture, and we have described the
information exchange required between an agent and the ACC security services.
Further detailed analysis and specification is, however, required for a complete
solution.
Another way to achieve secure agent communication appears to be the XML3
(Extensible Markup Language) specifications. A Document Type Definition
(DTD) to carry an ACL message has been defined by FIPA [42]. Various efforts
are in progress for specifying how cryptographic services can be applied to XML
[36, 60, 118]. These are also likely to provide the security services required for
agent message communication.
3See http://www.w3c.org/XML for information about XML and the ongoing work on XML
security.
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In this chapter a ‘pragmatic’ alternative to undetachable signatures is proposed,
relying on the use of conventional signatures and public key certificates.
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8.1 Introduction
As we established in section 2.3.5 there are limits to the protection that can be
offered to a mobile agent. An agent platform can potentially modify the agent
code, and/or interfere with the data stored by an agent. Hence efforts to protect
agents reduce to either finding ways to enhance the level of trust that can be
placed in results produced by an agent, or limiting the powers given to an agent.
This chapter focuses on the latter approach — in particular it considers the issue
of giving an agent the power to sign on a user’s behalf, without running the risk
of revealing the user’s private signature key to the platform on which the agent
is executed. Some of the work described in this chapter has been previously
published in [17]. Observe that this chapter can be seen as providing a specific
solution to issues raised under the ‘non-repudiation’ heading in section 5.3.2.
As described in section 3.3.10, undetachable signatures can be used to limit
the information over which a valid signature can be produced by encoding con-
straints into a function f . Whilst the original scheme proposed in [98] has
proven insecure, an alternative RSA-based scheme proposed by Kotzanikolaou,
Burmester and Chrissikopoulos [81], appears to be sound. However, it is a new
scheme, and should perhaps be used with care. In the remainder of this chapter
we describe an alternative approach which uses only well-established crypto-
graphic techniques. The scheme is described in section 8.2. In section 8.3 we
observe the relationship to delegation schemes, before giving the conclusions of
this chapter in section 8.4.
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8.2 Solving the problem the conventional way
We now consider an alternative solution to the problem which undetachable
signatures have been introduced to solve. This solution is wholly based on
conventional cryptographic primitives, and hence may be more likely to succeed
in practice. It is also quite general in its specification, allowing the use of any
digital signature scheme.
8.2.1 Preliminaries
Suppose user U wishes to create a mobile agent A that may run on one or more
agent platforms not completely trusted by U . Suppose also that user U wishes
to give A the power to sign statements on behalf of U , as long as the statement
conforms to rules specified in a string R (where R is in a form agreed by all
parties to the transaction). It is possible that R may be completely explicit
about the rules governing the signing process by the agent, or R may simply
contain one or more pointers to generally agreed policy statements, perhaps
with additional parameters.
Note that it is implicit to the solution described immediately below, and also
to the solutions using undetachable signatures, that the agent is transferred by
U to the platform on which it is to execute by some secure means. This secure
transfer should enable the receiving agent platform to check its integrity and
origin, and also should protect the confidentiality of all the sensitive parts of
the agent (most crucially including any embedded secret or private keys).
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8.2.2 Preparing the agent
Before sending the agent A, user U performs the following steps. Note that we
assume that U has a signature key pair of its own, (SU , PU ) say, and a certificate
CertU for its own public key, PU , signed by a Certification Authority (CA).
1. U generates a signature key pair (SA, PA) specifically for use by the agent.
2. U creates a public key certificate CertA for the agent’s public key (PA),
signed using U ’s own signature key (SU ). This certificate also contains a
copy of the string R, which states in what circumstances A’s key may be
used, and which makes it clear that PA is an agent key. It is also expected
that this certificate would have a very short lifetime, i.e. it would have an
expiry date very close to the time of issue.
3. U now equips the agent A with the private signature key SA, and copies
of the two certificates CertA and CertU .
4. A is now securely transferred to one or more agent platforms.
8.2.3 Executing the agent
When A executes, it may be necessary for A to sign a message of some kind (e.g.
a commitment to a transaction) on behalf of user U . Such a transaction should
be signed using the agent’s private key SA, and the signature should then be
transferred with the two certificates CertA and CertU to the entity requiring the
commitment, e.g. a merchant. The recipient of the commitment, M say, then
performs the following steps.
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1. The user’s certificate CertU is verified by M using a trusted copy of the
CA’s public key. Note that if M does not have this CA’s public key, then
it will need to be derived by some means, e.g. using a certificate chain. M
may also want to contact a revocation service to ensure that the certificate
has not been revoked.
2. M checks that it is prepared to accept a commitment from U , and also
checks that the name in the certificate is consistent with the user name
received from the agent.
3. The agent’s certificate CertA is verified by M using the copy of U ’s public
key obtained in the first step.
4. M checks that the string R contained in CertA is consistent with the
transaction that is taking place.
5. M finally checks the agent’s signature using the copy of A’s public key
obtained from CertA.
It should be clear that, by the simple step of including R in the certificate for
A’s key pair, the power given to A by U can be limited to that specified by U .
This has been achieved without any need for a new cryptosystem.
8.2.4 Remarks on implementation
Before attempting to compare this new scheme with the use of undetachable
signatures we make some remarks about the implementation of the scheme.
• Given that the agent key pair has only a short lifetime, it may be possible
to use a relatively short key. That is, if the signature scheme is RSA
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based, a short modulus could be used, say of 512 bits, in the knowledge
that factoring the modulus and hence breaking the key would be infeasible
during the key’s lifetime. This would make key generation faster and
would reduce the amount of key information to be transferred. It would
also mean that creating and verifying agent signatures could be made
significantly more efficient.
• If a ‘weak’ key pair was used for the agent key, or, more generally, if
the certificate for the agent key pair has a very short period of validity,
problems might arise if the agent’s signature is required to have long term
validity, e.g. to provide a non-repudiation service in the event of a dispute.
The ‘standard’ way of resolving this problem is to use a timestamping ser-
vice to sign a concatenation of the signature and a timestamp, providing
evidence that the signature was generated during the key’s period of va-
lidity. An alternative to using a trusted timestamping service would be to
simply require the agent platform to add a timestamp and its signature
to any signed commitments output by the agent. Not only would this
provide evidence about when the agent signed the message, but it would
also enable the recipient of the signed message to verify on which platform
the agent was running. This would appear to be a valuable service in its
own right, which would apply equally to the case where an undetachable
signature scheme is employed.
8.2.5 A brief comparison
We now attempt to briefly compare the efficiency of the above scheme with the
efficiency achievable using an undetachable signature scheme. For the purposes
of the comparison we suppose that signatures for the scheme in this chapter
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are computed using RSA and a hash function, and we compare this with the
RSA-based undetachable signature scheme of Kotzanikolaou et al. [81]. To
compare the efficiencies of the two schemes we compare separately the work to be
performed by the user U , the agent A, and the recipient of the commitment, M .
• User U . For the scheme above, the user will be required to generate a
key pair and certify the public key, i.e. compute one signature and gener-
ate one key pair. For the undetachable signature scheme of [81], the user
is required to perform two exponentiations, equivalent in complexity to
performing two signatures. Note that, whilst key generation will typically
take much longer than computing a signature, key pairs could not only
be made quite small (as discussed above), but could be generated in ad-
vance. Hence, the new scheme, whilst requiring more computation overall,
actually requires less computation at the time of agent creation.
• Agent A. For the new scheme, the agent is required to compute one
signature. For the undetachable signature scheme, the agent is required
to perform two exponentiations, equivalent to two signatures. Moreover,
for the undetachable signature scheme these will be ‘full size’ signatures,
whereas for the new scheme the key lengths may be reduced (as above).
• Recipient of commitment M . For the new scheme the recipient of the
signed message will be required to verify two certificates and a signature,
i.e. a total of three signature verifications. For the undetachable signa-
tures scheme it is also necessary to verify the user’s certificate, as well
as performing two exponentiations. Hence the two schemes have roughly
comparable efficiencies.
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It would appear that the scheme of this chapter has potential efficiency advan-
tages over the undetachable signature scheme, quite apart from the advantages
inherent in using established cryptographic primitives.
8.3 Relationship to secure delegation schemes
Note that the problem which the proposed solution is designed to address ap-
pears to be closely related to the problem of secure delegation in distributed
systems. Delegation refers to the situation where one entity wishes a separate
entity to perform a task on its behalf. Security problems arise when the dele-
gated entity does not have the access rights to perform the task, and hence must
be temporarily given these rights in order to perform the requested actions. The
issue then becomes one of giving these rights in such a way that they cannot be
abused. See, for example, [30] for a general introduction to delegation issues.
An analogous approach to the one described here has been proposed by several
authors as a solution to secure delegation — see, for example, [109]. However,
instead of the use of a public-key certificate, special ’delegation tokens’ have
been proposed. Note also that issues can arise with any such solution since
the originating user will have a copy of the private key generated for agent
use. The user may use this key to masquerade as the agent, and then deny the
transaction, blaming the platform on which the agent has run. The proposed
use of countersignatures by the agent platform, as described in section 8.2.4
above, significantly reduces the seriousness of this threat.
136
8. A pragmatic alternative to undetachable signatures
8.4 Conclusions
A pragmatic solution to a mobile agent security problem has been proposed.
This solution has potential practical advantages by comparison with the use
of undetachable signatures, and appears to offer a very similar set of security
guarantees. When combined with the use of signatures by the agent platform,
this solution has the potential to solve certain problems relating to transaction
repudiation.
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This chapter proposes two methods to improve the security and reliability of
mobile agent based transactions in an environment which may contain some
malicious hosts.
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9.1 Introduction
In this chapter we consider strategies for the deployment of mobile trading
agents to reduce certain security threats to their operation. In a future world
of co-operating mobile and fixed devices, the mobile agent computing model
is expected to become an increasingly important one. In the domain of e-
commerce/m-commerce transactions, mobile trading agents could play a very
useful role. Users could launch such agents to make transactions on their behalf,
and the agents would look for the ‘best buy’ by visiting multiple merchant sites
without any direct user intervention. Indeed such activity could take place while
the user has no current network connectivity.
The mobile agent computing model gives rise to a range of security threats. As
discussed in section 2.3.5, these threats can be divided into two main classes:
• threats to the platform from malicious and/or unauthorised agents, in-
cluding threats to the integrity of the platform and other agents, threats
to the confidentiality of stored data, and denial of service threats, and
• threats to the agent from malicious platforms, including threats to the
confidentiality of agent stored data, and threats to the integrity of the
agent and its computations.
In this chapter we are concerned with the second class of threats, and in par-
ticular with threats to agents deployed for trading applications. Specifically,
users will need to give trading agents certain authority to authorise transac-
tions, whilst at the same time users will wish to protect themselves against
malicious merchants forcing an agent to make a non-optimal purchase.
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We consider simple ways in which deployment of multiple agents can reduce the
threat to trading agents from platforms outside of their direct control. We con-
sider two general approaches. In the first approach multiple agents are equipped
with ‘shares’ of the means to commit to a transaction. In the second approach a
single trusted host provides a location for multiple agents to ‘report back’ infor-
mation enabling a purchasing decision to be made. Some of the work described
in this chapter has been previously published in [14].
The chapter has the following structure. Section 9.2 explores threats to trading
agents in more detail. This is followed in sections 9.3 and 9.4 by a discussion of
the models used here for agent platforms and for trading agents. Sections 9.5
and 9.6 then explore the two approaches for enhancing trading agent security.
Section 9.7 gives the conclusions of this chapter.
9.2 Threats to trading agents
The general threats to mobile agents have been described in section 2.3.5. In
this section we consider the particular threats to a trading agent in more detail.
That is, we consider the particular threats to an agent which wishes to purchase
an item (or a service) from a merchant.
1. A malicious host lies about its offer.
Here a host lies about the offer it makes to an agent, in order to get the
trade. The host would then charge a higher price at a later date. One way
around this is to force the host to sign its bid, thereby committing to it.
2. A malicious host learns other offers and undercuts them.
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If a host knows that all offers but its own have been collected and finds
out the best standing offer, it can undercut the best standing offer slightly
(in fact the host need not know all other offers, it could just undercut the
current offers). Of course, in some circumstances letting hosts undercut
each other might be considered a desirable feature.
3. A malicious host learns the maximum price a user is prepared to pay and
bids just under this.
In a similar fashion the host may charge more than its normal price, if it
knows the maximum price the user is prepared to pay. Thus a host must
be kept from learning the maximum price a user is prepared to pay, either
by encrypting this information or by not sending this information with
the agent.
4. A malicious host manipulates the requirements.
This is when the host changes the requirements to favour its bid. For
example, it could add a requirement to buy from a certain host, or remove
constraints from the agent.
5. A malicious host alters the agent’s route.
Here, the host keeps the agent away from its competitors, and thus secures
the agent’s trade. One way to prevent this is to use more than one agent
(possibly an agent per host), send each agent on a different route and
combine the offers on the agent’s return. Another way is to use one agent
with a ‘star’ like route – it returns home after visiting each host before
being sent out to a different host.
6. A malicious host commits to purchases that the user does not wish to
make.
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This happens when a host can abuse the committal function that an agent
has. A method to discourage this is to force the host to sign a transaction,
as well as the user (thus providing traceability).
7. A malicious host denies the agent a service.
Here a host would stop an agent from moving further on its route. This of
course could be traced if an agent reports back when it arrives at a host.
8. A malicious host captures electronic money.
Here a host would remove the electronic money that an agent may have
to purchase an item and either steals the money outright, or uses it for a
different purchase.
We do not consider the payment process here, as we are concerned only with
the part of a transaction involved in selecting a merchant and committing to
the transaction.
9.3 Models of agent platforms
Mobile agents roam between platforms. However, they can also communicate
with each other, and with other hosts. This leads to the question as to the best
“platform model” to use for trading (or indeed any other) agents. There are
clearly two basic approaches which we now describe.
The first approach (see Figure 9.1) is to have a designated platform (or a col-
lection of such platforms) to which we can send an agent to execute. This agent
then communicates with merchant hosts to seek information and commit to
purchases.
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Figure 9.1: A model for agent platforms
The second model (see Figure 9.2) is to have an agent roam to each merchant
host in turn and collect the information it requires. After collecting all the
information the agent can then either return to the user to make the purchase,
return to the chosen merchant to make the purchase or make the purchase from
the final host.
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Figure 9.2: A second model for agent platforms
In a mobile telecommunications environment it may also be beneficial to have a
third model. This is where the requirements for a purchase are communicated to
a ‘home platform’ (the user’s home PC or a network operator controlled device)
which then forms the agent and conforms to one of the above models.
In the above, any of the platforms may be malicious, with the possible exception
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of the home platform. The solutions proposed below can be made to fit into
any of the above situations, although they both fit better into the first model.
The security risks associated with the above two models clearly differ. In the
first case, the ‘designated platform’ might be trusted to keep secret certain
agent information. An example of where this might be useful is when the agent
contains details of the user ‘expected’ price (or maximum price), which it would
be helpful not to reveal to the merchant. Of course, the threat then arises that
one of the designated platforms will collude with one or more of the merchants.
In the second case, it is clearly impossible to try and keep any information in
the agent secret from the merchants. In both cases, however, as we will show
in the remainder of this chapter, there are potential benefits to be gained from
the use of multiple agents, albeit not from the confidentiality perspective.
9.4 Model for a trading agent
We consider the information that an agent wishing to trade must know. Firstly,
when initiating a purchase, a user will have a set of requirements (for instance
the item to be purchased, the maximum price for that item, a time limit within
which the purchase to be made). We will assume that a user encodes these
requirements into a string R which is understood by all parties. When a host
quotes for a given purchase, it will also produce a similar string with its offer.
The agent, if it is to perform the purchase on behalf of the user, must also
carry a function which will commit to the trade. This could be performed by,
for instance, signing the details of the trade. One scheme to allow an agent to
perform a signature operation on behalf of a user without revealing the user’s
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private key to a host is the undetachable signature scheme proposed in [81] (see
also section 11.2). In this scheme, using RSA, an agent carries both the hash
value, h, of the requirements and the signed hash value, hd mod n, where (d, n)
is the user’s private RSA key. To commit to a transaction for the user the agent
calculates
(hd)x = hxd = (hx)d mod n
effectively signing hx where x is the host’s offer. An alternative to this, where the
agent carries its own private key which the user certifies, was given in chapter 8.
Thus we assume that a trading agent will carry the following information:
• User Identifier – U
• Requirements for purchase – R
• A committal function – C. The committal function is used by the agent
to commit to a transaction on the user’s behalf. C could be a signature
function using a special private key provided to the agent by the user
(as in chapter 8), or, C could be a function of the type described above,
derived from the user’s own private signature key. In any event, we assume
that the function is designed so that only transactions within constraints
defined by the user can be authorised.
Note that, if a single ‘trading agent’ is deployed there are a number of problems
which might arise. Firstly, although the committal function will typically be
limited to transactions conforming to user-defined parameters, there is still the
possibility that the agent platform will force the agent to commit to a transaction
which is less than optimal. It may also commit to more than one transaction,
even if the user only intended to make at most one purchase.
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One way to reduce this threat is to deploy multiple agents, a subset of which
must agree to the transaction before it can be authorised. Such an approach is
the focus of the remainder of this chapter.
9.5 Threshold scheme
One means of addressing the malicious host problem is to use multiple agents
each of which has a ‘vote’. If one of the possible transactions receives enough
votes, then a transaction will be authorised with the relevant merchant. We
begin by outlining the scheme, and then consider the details of what a secure
vote can consist. We assume use of a (k, n) scheme – i.e. a merchant will need
k votes out of a possible n to ‘win’.
9.5.1 The scheme
Let P = {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} be a set of agent platforms. The user then sets up
a (k, n) voting scheme with shares v1, v2, . . . , vn. Clearly k should exceed the
number of ‘suspected’ malicious hosts. Given no information about the system
a sensible value would probably be n/2 + 1. The value of k reflects the level of
trust in the system.
The user then forms n agents Ai (1 ≤ i ≤ n) containing the following informa-
tion
• User Identifier – U
• Requirements for purchase – R
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• A vote – vi
Each agent is then dispatched to its agent platform. At the platform there are
two modes of execution:
1. The agent contacts each merchant itself, and gathers bids that meet the
requirements.
2. The agent contacts a subset of the merchants and communicates the best
bid to its peers.
We note that for case 2, if an agent is contacting a number of merchants, and
these merchants are only contacted by one agent, a successful attack can be
achieved by compromising less than k hosts.
When each agent has received all the information about each bid, the agent sends
its vote to the merchant with the best offer. On receipt of the correct number
of votes, the merchant or a nominated third party can construct (and verify)
the authorisation for the bid from the votes. The merchant or nominated third
party can then use this as evidence that the user has committed to transaction.
We now consider the security of the above scheme. The major advantage of the
scheme is the need to corrupt either n− k + 1 agents to prevent the transaction
or k hosts to divert or alter the transaction. Thus the choice of k is crucial.
This also means that a denial of service attack is harder as a host or set of
colluding hosts will need to terminate (or prevent from communicating their
vote) n− k + 1 agents. Again to force a purchase, a host or hosts must force k
agents to offer their vote.
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If an agent visits a subset of the hosts involved, the information could then be
used to help identify any malicious hosts.
9.5.2 The votes
As mentioned above, the votes can be assembled by either the selected merchant
or a nominated third party. Note that there are clear risks associated with giving
votes to the merchant, since the merchant could now possibly commit the user
to a transaction of the merchant’s choice (within any constraints imposed by the
string R). That is, the merchant is not forced to commit to the transaction as
offered to the agents. Hence the use of a nominated third party to reconstruct
the votes is the preferred approach. The possibility that this may not be feasible
in practice leads to an alternative approach.
One approach is threshold cryptography as discussed in section 6.3.2. Recently
Shoup [103] proposed an RSA based scheme which is as efficient as possible;
the scheme uses only one level of secret sharing, each server sends a single part
signature to a combiner and must do work that is equivalent, up to a constant
factor, to computing a single RSA signature. Although not perfect as a threshold
signature scheme (as it relies on a trusted party to form the shares) this scheme
is ideal in our setting. (Note that an alternative scheme without a trusted dealer
is given in [32]. This scheme also improves on Shoup’s scheme by not relying on
an RSA modulus made up of ‘safe primes’). An example of an ElGamal based
scheme is given in [82]. We note that an (n, n) threshold signature scheme is
just a multisignature; such schemes have been studied for many years — see,
for example, page 488 of [87].
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We note, however, that such a threshold signature scheme does not provide a
means for the shares to incorporate an encoding of the string R. Thus, if there
were k colluding hosts they could sign (and reconstruct a signature) for any
document. One solution to this problem, analogous to the solution described
in chapter 8, is for the user to generate a special signature key pair for the
particular purchase (i.e. for this particular set of agents), and then to generate
a certificate for the public key incorporating a copy of R. When the signature is
reconstructed from the signature shares, it can be verified using this certificate.
An alternative approach is to merge the undetachable signature scheme given
in [81] with the threshold signature scheme of Shoup [103], and details of this
are given in chapter 11.
9.6 Using one trusted host
We consider a second solution to the problem, which employs a single trusted
host. We note that the solution described below involves a user sending out
agent(s) to individual merchant platforms, whereas it could just communicate
with them to ask for their bids. However, in a wireless communications setting
where communication is expensive, slow, and/or unreliable, it is believed to be
beneficial to be able to dispatch an agent into the fixed network. When the
agent has finished its task it contacts the user or waits for the user to collect
the result.
Let P = {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} be a collection of platforms offering a service that a
user wishes to purchase. Let T be a host that the user trusts to act honestly
in this transaction. (Note that we do not need to trust this host fully – it just
needs to be neutral in this transaction). Before the transaction commences we
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assume that each platform Pi securely establishes a shared secret key Ki with
T . Optionally, a key for message integrity checks could also be established.
The user dispatches an agent A to the trusted host T containing the information
outlined in section 9.4. We note that the committal function C may be of any
form with which the user is prepared to trust the host T . However, to reduce
the trust requirements we envisage that this will be an undetachable signature
scheme, e.g. the one described by Kotzanikolaou [81], or the scheme given in
chapter 8.
There are now several approaches for T . The first is to form a single subagent
containing the following information:
• agent identifier – I,
• requirements for purchase – R,
• host identifier – T ,
which would then visit each of the platforms in P in turn. We note that the
requirements sent out do not need to include pricing information (that is the
maximum price the user is prepared to pay) or any other information that
the user wishes to be used to help make the decision, but does not wish to
communicate to the platform. Another approach is to form a single agent for
each platform. A third approach has the above agent visiting a subset P ′ ⊂ P
of the above platforms. Whichever strategy is employed, at each host the agent
performs the following actions:
1. Find out the platform’s bid Bi for the item specified in the requirements
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R.
2. Encrypts the concatenation of Bi, R, Pi and I using the key Ki. At this
point the host could also, optionally, attach a MAC (Message Authentica-
tion Code) to protect the integrity of the host’s bid. Label the encrypted
string Ei.
3. The agent then stores the pair (Pi, Ei).
The agent returns to T when it has finished visiting all of its platforms. The
agent on T then decides the best offer and commits to it using the committal
function.
We note some of the features of the above scheme.
• Using an agent per host alleviates the need to encrypt anything, assuming
that agents are always transferred between hosts in encrypted form.
• Using a single agent leaves the scheme open to some attacks.
• Using more than one agent that does not visit all the hosts could be used
to (help) identify a malicious host.
If we use a single agent and it visits all the hosts, or we have an agent that visits
more than one host, the agent is subject to the following attacks:
• An approach to enable a malicious host to underbid its competitors is as
follows. The host forms a new agent containing the user’s requirements, a
fictitious user identifier, and its own host identifier. This agent would then
traverse the route of the user’s agent, and discover the bids offered for that
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set of requirements. The host could then underbid its competitors, but
the user’s agent would need to have been kept on the malicious host in
the interim period. Thus monitoring the progress of an agent could help
determine if such an attack was being used.
• A simple denial of service attack: stop the agent in its tracks. This attack
is hard to defeat if there is no progress monitoring of the agent’s movement.
• A malicious host could alter the pair (Pi, Ei) to read (Pj , junk) (where
junk is a random string of the correct length) to stop the decryption of
a bid. However as the host cannot read the bid, for this to be successful
(i.e. to delete those bids more attractive than those of the malicious host)
the host would have to have knowledge of all the bids, which it would have
to gather itself (possibly by cloning the agent).
If multiple agents are deployed, each agent visiting a subset of the hosts, and
each host is visited by several agents. It is possible to identify a misbehaving
host, assuming that enough agents are used. This also requires careful choice
of agent destinations and routing.
Note that to force T to purchase from a malicious host, the host has to lie and
then be unscrupulous, or just lie and possibly not profit as much as it would
expect. That is if the malicious host M wants to force a user to trade with
it, then it must have the best price. So it must either charge more than its
advertised price (possibly breaking the committal function) or make less profit
than it expects (because the price advertised is less than the host should sell
for).
We now consider the extent to which the user must trust the host T . The user
152
9. Mobile agent based transactions
must trust that T does not favour a particular platform for this transaction.
However, with a sufficiently good committal function then this is the only trust
requirement. For example using the Kotzanikolaou et al. undetachable signa-
ture scheme [81], as a committal function, T can be given the means to commit
to the transaction without being trusted with a copy of the user’s private sig-
nature key. This may be a situation where using an undetachable signature
scheme has advantages over the creation of a separate signature key for each
agent.
9.7 Conclusions
We have considered two different ways in which the deployment of multiple
agents can reduce the threat to mobile trading agents from potentially malicious
agent platforms. In the first approach multiple agents are equipped with ‘shares’
of the means to commit to a transaction. A method implementing this idea
using a threshold signature scheme, e.g. the recently proposed scheme of Shoup,
[103], was outlined. In the second approach a single trusted host is employed
to collect information from multiple agents on possible transactions. This host
then chooses the optimal transaction and commits to it.
The two approaches each have their own advantages. The first approach avoids
the need for a single trusted host. However, implementing the first approach
requires use of some potentially complex cryptographic signature functions. The
second approach is potentially less complex from a cryptographic perspective,
but does require a host which, if not completely trusted, is at least required
to act neutrally with respect to the set of merchants. Both approaches are of
potential practical importance in future mobile computing environments.
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This chapter presents some rather simple alternatives to threshold signatures
which raise questions about the value of such schemes, at least when applied to
the mobile agent scenario.
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10.1 Introduction
As discussed in section 6.3.2, threshold signature schemes enable a group of n
entities to be given ‘shares’ of a private signature key in such a way that, for
some parameter k (1 ≤ k ≤ n), any subset of k entities can collectively create
a valid signature on a message, whereas any collection of k− 1 or fewer entities
cannot. Schemes of this type have been discussed widely in the literature, and a
number of systems have been proposed; see for example [103] for a brief survey.
Again, as discussed in section 6.3.2, one particularly attractive scheme has been
recently proposed by Shoup, [103]. This scheme is based on RSA, and the
composite signature can be verified in exactly the same way as a ‘regular’ RSA
signature. In the discussion below we use this scheme as a ‘benchmark’ against
which alternatives can be compared. Some of the work described in this chapter
has been previously published in [16].
Section 10.2 motivates the use of threshold signatures for mobile agents. Sec-
tion 10.3 describes the alternative approach, relying on conventional cryptogra-
phy. Section 10.4 gives the conclusions of this chapter.
10.2 Mobile agents and threshold signatures
As pointed out in section 2.3.5, there are limits to the protection that can be
offered to an agent. An agent platform can potentially modify the agent code,
and/or interfere with the data stored by an agent. Hence efforts to protect
agents reduce to either finding ways to enhance the level of trust that can be
placed in results produced by an agent, or limiting the powers given to an agent.
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This chapter focuses on the former approach — in particular it considers the
issue of dividing a task amongst multiple agents to increase the level of trust in
the collective results of the agents.
In particular we are concerned with giving all subsets of agents of size k or more
the power to sign on a user’s behalf, without giving smaller groups of agents such
a capability. We suppose that the agents are set up to agree to a transaction,
the details of which the agents are to determine. As discussed in section 9.5
this might typically occur by giving the agents the power to visit a number of
merchants, and find out which merchant is offering a particular good or service
at the lowest price. Some of the agents may be modified by a malicious host,
but we assume that this occurs to at most k − 1 of them.
As discussed in more detail in chapter 9, this seems to be a natural application
for the notion of threshold signatures. The user launching the agents acts as
the ‘dealer’ in the threshold signature scheme, and creates the shares of the
signature key. Each agent is equipped with a share, and when a transaction is
to be signed creates a signature share. A third party (e.g. the merchant making
the transaction) receives the signature shares and uses them to construct a valid
signature. This distribution of trust across a multiplicity of agents reduces
the threat from small numbers of malicious hosts, who might be capable of
manipulating agent computations. Finally, note that this problem also relates
to the well-known concept of a multisignature which, for our purpose as least,
can be regarded as a special type of threshold signature for the case of k = n.
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10.3 An alternative based on conventional sig-
natures
We now consider an alternative solution to this trust distribution problem. Un-
like the use of threshold signatures, this solution is wholly based on conventional
cryptographic primitives, and hence may be more likely to succeed in practice.
It is also quite general in its specification, allowing the use of any digital signa-
ture scheme.
Note that it is implicit to the solution described immediately below, and also to
the solutions using threshold signatures, that the agents are transferred by the
user U to the hosts on which they are to execute by some secure means. This
secure transfer should enable the receiving host to check its integrity and origin,
and also should protect the confidentiality of all the sensitive parts of the agent
(most crucially including any embedded secret or private keys).
10.3.1 Preparing the agents
Before sending the agents, (which we label A1, A2, . . . , An) user U performs the
following steps. Note that we assume that U has a signature key pair of its own,
(SU , PU ) say, and a certificate CertU for its own public key, PU , signed by a
Certification Authority (CA).
1. U generates a signature key pair (Si, Pi) specifically for use by agent Ai.
2. U creates a public key certificate Certi for agent Ai’s public key (Pi),
signed using U ’s own signature key (SU ). This certificate also contains
policy information which indicates precisely the purpose of the certificate,
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and also the parameter k, indicating the ‘threshold value’ (as above). It is
also likely that this certificate will have a very short lifetime, i.e. it would
have an expiry date very close to the time of issue.
3. U now equips agent Ai with the private signature key Si, and copies of
the two certificates Certi and CertU .
4. Ai is now securely transferred to one or more agent platforms.
10.3.2 Executing an agent
Now suppose that some subset of k agents decide that they wish to collectively
sign a message (e.g. to commit to a transaction with a merchant) on behalf of
user U . Each agent Ai signs the message using its own private key Si, and
the signature is then transferred with the two certificates Certi and CertU to
the entity requiring the signature, e.g. a merchant. The recipient of the agent
signatures, M say, then performs the following steps for each received agent
signature.
1. The user’s certificate Certi is verified by M using a trusted copy of the
CA’s public key. If M does not have this CA’s public key, then it will need
to be derived by some means, e.g. using a certificate chain. The agent then
checks that it is prepared to accept a signature from U , and also checks
that the name in the certificate is consistent with the user name received
from the agent.
Note that this step will only need to be performed once for the k agent
signatures.
2. The agent’s certificate Certi is verified by M using the copy of U ’s public
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key obtained in the first step.
3. M finally checks the agent’s signature using the copy of Ai’s public key
obtained from Certi.
The merchant waits until k valid agent signatures have been received (recall that
k was encoded in each agent certificate). The collection of k agent signatures
is then deemed to be equivalent to the signature of the user, and the merchant
proceeds with the transaction. The collection of k agent signatures (with the
accompanying certificates) are retained as evidence of the transaction.
10.3.3 Remarks on implementation
Before attempting to compare this new scheme with the use of threshold signa-
tures we make some remarks about the implementation of the scheme.
• Given that the agent key pairs have only a short lifetime, it may be possible
to use relatively short keys. That is, if the signature scheme is RSA based,
a short modulus could be used, say of 512 bits, in the knowledge that
factoring the modulus and hence breaking the key would be infeasible
during the key’s lifetime. This would make key generation faster and
would reduce the amount of key information to be transferred. It would
also mean that creating and verifying agent signatures could be made
significantly more efficient.
• If a ‘weak’ key pair was used for an agent key, or, more generally, if the cer-
tificate for an agent key pair has a very short period of validity, problems
might arise if the agent’s signature is required to have long term validity,
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e.g. to provide a non-repudiation service in the event of a dispute. The
‘standard’ way of resolving this problem is to use a timestamping service
to sign a concatenation of the signature and a timestamp, providing evi-
dence that the signature was generated during the key’s period of validity.
An alternative to using a trusted timestamping service would be to simply
require the agent host to add a timestamp and its signature to any sig-
natures output by the agent. Not only would this provide evidence about
when the agent signed the message, but it would also enable the merchant
receiving of the signature to verify on which host the agent was running.
This would appear to be a valuable service in its own right.
• The scheme as described does not restrict the nature (e.g. value and/or
type) of messages which the agents can collectively sign. However, a re-
striction could easily be imposed by including the scope of the agent keys
in the respective agent public key certificates, as described in chapter 8.
• This scheme is in some respects analogous to the widely discussed notion
of delegation using special delegation keys – see for example [30] for an
introduction to delegation issues and [109] for one approach to the use of
delegation keys.
10.3.4 A brief comparison
We now attempt to briefly compare the efficiency of the above scheme with the
efficiency achievable using the Shoup threshold signature scheme [103]. For the
purposes of the comparison we suppose that signatures for the scheme in this
chapter are computed using RSA, and we compare this with the Shoup RSA-
based threshold signature scheme [103]. To compare the efficiencies of the two
schemes we compare separately the work to be performed by the user U , each
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agent Ai, and the recipient of the agent signatures M .
• User U . For the scheme above, the user will be required to generate one
key pair for each agent Ai, and certify the public keys, i.e. compute n
signatures and generate n key pairs. For the threshold signature scheme
of [103], the user is only required to generate at most one key pair (for
the secret key that is shared by the n agents). However, each agent will
need to be equipped with a public key certificate for its share, so that the
signature share can be verified by the merchant (or whoever combines the
signature shares). Hence the user will be required to generate one key pair
and compute n signatures. Note that, whilst key generation will typically
take much longer than computing a signature, key pairs for the scheme
described in this chapter could not only be made quite small (as discussed
above), but could be generated in advance. Hence, the new scheme, whilst
requiring more computation overall, actually requires comparable amounts
of computation at the time of agent creation.
• Agent Ai. For the new scheme, the agent is required to compute one
signature. For the Shoup scheme, each agent is required to perform one
exponentiation, equivalent to one signature.
• Recipient of agent signatures M . For the new scheme the recipient of
the signed message will be required to verify k + 1 certificates (the user
certificate and the k agent certificates) and k signatures, i.e. a total of 2k+1
signature verifications. For the Shoup scheme it is also necessary to verify
the user’s certificate, as well the k agent certificates and the k signature
shares. Hence the two schemes have roughly comparable computational
efficiencies. Of course, the storage efficiency for the scheme described
above will be rather less than for the Shoup scheme, unless it is necessary
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to retain the signature shares for auditing purposes.
In summary it would appear that the scheme of this chapter is really quite
comparable with the Shoup threshold signature scheme, with two exceptions.
Initialising the scheme requires a number of key generations, which, however,
could be done ‘off-line’. The other difference is in the size of storage required
for signatures, which is significantly larger for the new scheme.
However, this advantage of the Shoup scheme disappears if the signature shares
must be kept for auditing purposes. Indeed, this is not such an unlikely scenario,
since, in the event of a dispute, it will be valuable to learn which agents took
part in the signing process. Thus the implementation efficiency differences,
which could be rather minor in practice, could easily be outweighed by the
advantages inherent in using established cryptographic primitives.
Finally observe that one other difference between the approach proposed here
and the use of threshold signatures relates to the issues of anonymity and ac-
countability. In most threshold signature schemes, the verifier of the signature
cannot determine which of the k shareholders created the signature, whereas
with the above approach there is no anonymity for agents. In some circum-
stances the anonymity property may be desirable, but in many agent applica-
tions the reverse is likely to be true. That is, the originator of the agents will
in many cases wish to have the means to determine which agents performed the
action on its behalf.
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10.4 Conclusions
A pragmatic alternative to threshold signatures has been proposed. This alter-
native has potential practical advantages by comparison with the use of thresh-
old signatures, and appears to offer a very similar set of security guarantees.
Although the analysis was performed within the context of mobile agents, it is
possible that the scheme described here is competitive with the Shoup threshold
signature scheme in other environments.
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This chapter introduces the concept of undetachable threshold signatures, which
enables constrained signing power to be distributed across multiple agents, thus
reducing the necessary trust in single agent platforms.
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11.1 Introduction
A digital signature is the electronic counterpart to a written signature. Thus one
way to commit to an electronic transaction is by the use of a digital signature.
It would be useful to let mobile agents be able to commit to transactions on a
user’s behalf. Mobile agents, however, face the problem of having to execute in
a hostile environment where the host executing the agent has access to all the
data that an agent has stored (for instance the private signature key).
Undetachable signatures, see section 3.3.10, can be used to limit the information
over which a valid signature can be produced by encoding constraints into a
function f . However, one problem with this approach is that the agent is still
given the power to sign any transaction it likes, subject to the requirement that
the transaction must be consistent with the constraints used to construct f .
Thus, for example, whilst the constraints may limit the nature and/or value of
a transaction, a malicious host may force an agent to commit to a transaction
much less favourable than could be achieved.
Thus, to protect further against malicious hosts, a user may wish to use more
than one agent and have the agents agree on a bid before committing to it.
Hence, a user may send out n agents with the criteria that k of them must agree
before committing to a purchase. The obvious solution to such a requirement
is to employ a threshold signature scheme, meaning that agents can all sign the
bid they think ‘best’ given the user’s requirements, and then, on receipt of a
sufficient number of these bids, the user’s signature can be reconstructed.
However, such a scheme does not possess the means to constrain the power
given to a quorum of agents. This motivates the introduction of the concept of
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an undetachable threshold signature which both distributes signature authority
across multiple agents and simultaneously constrains the signatures that may
be constructed. Some of the work described in this chapter has been previously
published in [15].
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. In section 11.2 we outline the
undetachable signature scheme of [81], and in section 11.3 we briefly review
threshold signatures and describe the method of Shoup [103] to construct such
a scheme. In section 11.4 we define the concept of an undetachable threshold
signature, and show how an example of such a scheme may be obtained by
combining the schemes of [81] and [103]. Section 11.5 gives the conclusions of
the chapter.
11.2 RSA undetachable signatures
We briefly present the RSA undetachable signature scheme given in [81]. The
user sets up an RSA signature pair in the usual manner, that is the user selects
an RSA modulus n which is the product of two primes p and q, and a number e
such that 1 ≤ e ≤ φ(n) = (p−1)(q−1) and gcd(e, φ(n)) = 1. Let d be such that
1 ≤ d ≤ φ(n) and ed = 1 mod φ(n). The user then publishes the verification
key (n, e) and keeps d as the private signing key.
Let I be an identifier for the user and R the encoded requirements of the user
for a purchase (we assume that R is encoded in a manner which is understood
by all parties). Let h be an appropriate hash function (i.e. one giving a value
in Zn
1). The user then forms H = h(I,R).
1We note that this property of a hash function is non-trivial to achieve efficiently. It is
also non-trivial to obtain a uniform distribution over Zn based on existing constructions that
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The user then gives an agent the user identifier, the requirements, and the pair
(H,G) as its undetachable signature, where G = Hd mod n. To sign a bid B
(which we assume is in the same format as R), the executing host calculates
x = h(B). The undetachable signature is then the pair (Hx, Gx). We note that,
Gx = (Hd)x = Hdx = Hxd = (Hx)d
so that the server has signed the value Hx with the user’s private key.
We briefly note that this scheme appears secure, and an informal proof of this
fact is given in [81]2. To forge a signature on a different set of requirements
R′ a malicious host would need to forge H ′ = h(I,R′), G′ = (H ′)d and (G′)x.
Clearly the main obstacle to the attacker is the need to forge G′, and this would
require knowledge of a user’s private key. Having said this, there is nothing in
this scheme to prevent a host from signing more than one bid, or presenting a
bid that just meets the requirements of the user (as opposed to a possibly better
offer).
11.3 Threshold signatures
As previously described in section 6.3.2, by using threshold signatures we can
distribute trust amongst a number of agents, rather than relying on the correct
execution of a single agent. Recently Shoup [103] proposed an RSA based
threshold signature scheme which is as efficient as possible; the scheme uses
only one level of secret sharing, each server sends a single part signature to a
yield mappings onto the set of n-bit strings. A slow construction of such a hash function is
given in [5].
2The authors of the paper claim that the security of their scheme rests on the difficulty
of forging RSA signatures. A short argument is given in the paper to support this claim. It
appears that this argument can be developed into a more formal security proof relating the
security of their scheme to that of the underlying RSA signature scheme in the random oracle
model.
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combiner, and must do work that is equivalent, up to a small constant factor,
to computing a single RSA signature.
Although in some sense not perfect as a threshold signature scheme (as it relies
on a trusted party to form the shares) this scheme is ideal in our setting, where
the user dispatching the agent will always (one would hope) trust themselves.
(Note that an alternative scheme without a trusted dealer is given in [32]. This
scheme also improves on [103] by not relying on an RSA modulus made up of
‘safe primes’). An example of an ElGamal based scheme is given in [82].
We next briefly outline the threshold signature scheme of [103].
The user (dealer) forms the following:
• An RSA modulus n = pq where p = 2p′ + 1 and q = 2q′ + 1 are safe
primes, i.e. p′, q′ are prime.
• A public exponent e, where e is prime, and a private key d, where de ≡ 1
(mod p′q′).
• A polynomial f(x) =
∑k−1
i=0 aix
i where a0 = d and ai ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p
′q′−1}
(selected at random) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
• L(n), the bit length of n, and L1, a secondary security parameter — Shoup
[103] suggests L1 = 128.
• The l signature key shares of the scheme si, where each si is selected at
random from the set {s|0 ≤ s ≤ 2L(n)+L1 , s ≡ f(i) mod (p′q′)}.
• The verification keys VK = v and VKi = v
si where v ∈ Qn, the subgroup
of squares of Z∗n.
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• A global hash function h mapping into Z∗n.
• A second hash function g whose output is an L1-bit integer.
In this scheme a shareholder signs a message m in the following manner. Firstly
the shareholder calculates the hash of the message, i.e. x = h(m). The signature
share of a shareholder i then consists of
xi = x
2∆si
and a ‘proof of correctness’ (note that ∆ = l!). The proof of correctness is
basically just a proof that the discrete logarithm of x2i to the base x
4∆ is the
same as the discrete logarithm of vi to the base v. Let L(n) be the bit length of
n. The shareholder then chooses a random number r ∈ {0, . . . , 2L(n)+3L1 − 1}
and computes
v′ = vr, x′ = x4∆r, c = g(v, x4∆, vi, v
′, x′), z = sic + r.
The proof of correctness is then (z, c) which can be verified by calculating
c = g(v, x4∆, vi, x
2
i , v
zv−ci , x
4∆zx−2ci ).
To combine the shares the combiner acts as follows. Assume we have valid
shares from a set S = {i1, i2, . . . , ik} of shareholders. The combiner computes
λS0,j = ∆
∏
i∈S\{j}
i
(i− j)
.
These values are derived from the standard Lagrange interpolation formula.
These values are integers and it is clear that they are easy to compute. We also
have, from the Lagrange interpolation formula that,
∆ · f(0) =
∑
j∈S
λS0,jf(j) mod (p
′q′).
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In other words we have,
d ·∆ =
∑
j∈S
λS0,jsj
The combiner then computes,
w = x
2λS
0,i1
i1
· · ·x
2λS
0,ik
ik
= x4∆
2
∑
j∈S(sjλ
S
0,j)
= x4∆
5d.
To check this signature we note that we = x4∆
5
where gcd(e, 4∆5) = 1. As e
is coprime to 4∆5 we can find a, b such that a(4∆5) + be = 1 so that we finally
have the signature
ye = (waxb)e = x.
11.4 Undetachable threshold signatures
We now introduce the notion of an undetachable threshold signature. Suppose
a user has a private signature key s and a public verification key v. Suppose
also that the user has a ‘constraint string’ R, which will define what types of
signature can be created. Then an undetachable threshold signature scheme
will enable the user to provide n entities with ‘shares’ of the private signature
key (where the shares will be a function of R), where the following properties
must be satisfied:
• Each entity can use their share to sign a message m of their choice to
obtain a ‘signature share’.
• The ‘correctness’ of a signature share can be verified independently of any
other signature shares.
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• Any entity, when equipped with k different signature shares for the same
message m, can construct a signature on the message m which will be
verifiable by any party with a trusted copy of the public key of the user,
and which will also enable the string R to be verified.
• Knowledge of less than k different signature shares for the same message
m cannot be used to construct a valid signature on the message m.
• Knowledge of any number of signature shares (up to a bound polynomial in
the key length3) for messages other than m will not enable the construction
of a valid signature on message m.
• Knowledge of any number of different signature shares for constraints
strings other than R will not enable the construction of a valid signature
with associated constraint string R.
As discussed above, the motivation for introducing this concept is that the use
of a threshold signature scheme or a detachable signature scheme on its own
would not protect against all possible attacks in a mobile agent scenario. We
now describe an example of such a scheme. For brevity, we only give the neces-
sary changes to the threshold scheme in section 11.3 to form the undetachable
threshold signature scheme.
Recall that the secret share for shareholder i consists of a number si. Let h
be an appropriate hash function. The signature share of this shareholder for a
message m is then
xi = x
2·∆·si .
3The bound is necessary to make the scheme realisable. Without such a bound, attacks
such as those of Desmedt and Odlyzko [34] will apply. The exact nature of the bound will
depend on the details of the scheme.
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where l is the total number of shares, ∆ = l! and x = h(m) is a hash of the
message.
As in section 11.2 let I be the identifier of a user and let R be the user require-
ments. Let H = h(I,R) be a hash of the requirements. We replace the share
si with a pair (H, ti = H
2·∆·si). To sign a bid B the shareholder calculates
C = h(B) and
tCi = (H
2·∆·si)C = H2·∆·siC = (HC)2·∆·si .
Thus, when all the shares are combined the combiner will have a signed copy of
HC , thus achieving a signed undetachable signature.
We observe that a proof of security is given for the scheme in section 11.3
provided that k is one greater than the number of corrupt servers (in the case
where k exceeds the number of corrupt servers by a greater number a slightly
adapted scheme is used). With this information to hand we note that this
scheme is secure as long as the undetachable scheme given in [81] is secure, and
that this scheme appears to be sound.
11.5 Conclusions
By combining threshold signatures and undetachable signatures, the concept
of undetachable threshold signatures was introduced. Undetachable threshold
signatures enable constrained signing power to be distributed across multiple
agents, thus reducing the necessary trust in single agent platforms even further,
compared to only using threshold signatures or undetachable signatures.
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In this chapter the concept of certificate translation is defined and examples of
its applications are proposed.
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12.1 Introduction
As we have argued in chapters 5 and 6, asymmetric cryptography and a Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI) can be used to achieve secure agent communication.
Digital certificates have a central role in any PKI. The traditional way to enable
communication between entities in different PKIs is to utilise cross certification
where a Certification Authority (CA) issues a certificate for a CA in another
PKI. However, such certificates may not exist or may not be directly useable
for various reasons.
Certificates used in different PKI implementations tend to have different struc-
tures and different information stored in them. This can make communication
between entities of different PKIs tedious or even impossible. Although many
PKIs make use of standard formats for certificates such as X.509 [76], this can
still create problems since, as in the case of X.509, the standard supports ex-
tension fields that are not defined within the standard.
If agents are deployed to represent users, they are likely to encounter applica-
tions and circumstances requiring various formats of digital certificates. Since
many agents would reside on mobile devices with limited memory and pro-
cessing resources, the number of private keys and digital certificates carried by
the agents should be kept to a minimum. In these circumstances the concept
presented in this chapter, certificate translation, is likely to be useful. Other
applications where certificate translation can be used include WTLS [113] and
MExE [1], which are both examples of applications using public key certificates
designed for a wireless mobile environment. Some of the work described in this
chapter has been previously published in [12].
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The rest of this chapter has the following structure. In section 12.2 we de-
fine and describe the concept of certificate translation. Section 12.3 describes
security considerations that are introduced with translated certificates. In sec-
tion 12.4 we describe some possible applications for certificate translation. In
section 12.5 we describe how certificate translation can be used for WAP and
MExE. Section 12.6 proposes certificate translation as an extension to SCVP.
Section 12.7 outline a protocol for certificate translation. Section 12.8 gives the
conclusions of the chapter.
12.2 General concept
By electronically signing a public key along with an entity identifier and possibly
various other attributes, a certification authority provides assurance regarding
the relationship between the public key and the included attributes. If any
of these attributes are changed a new CA signature must be applied to the
certificate.
In certain circumstances, such as where a certificate carries an incompatible
certificate field or is of an incompatible type from that which the end user
understands, it would be useful to make changes to existing certificates. Such
changes can be achieved using certificate translation, a concept that forms the
main focus of this chapter. We now define the terms underlying this translation
concept. A translated certificate is a certificate to which changes have been
made since it was originally issued. Changes to a certificate’s content as well
as to its format (e.g. structure, coding) may have been made. The value of the
public key is the only certificate field that may not be altered. A certificate
translation service is able to accept a certificate and create a new (translated)
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certificate with a modified structure and/or content. A certificate translation
server (CTS) is a server that offers a certificate translation service to clients. A
certificate translation server would have to be trusted by its clients, the entities
using the service, just like any traditional CA has to be trusted by its users.
If the CA who signed the original certificate is ‘accessible’ (and willing) it can
issue a new certificate including the public key of the original certificate and any
other attributes that apply. On other occasions the CA who issued the original
certificate will not be available or able to issue a certain certificate. On such
occasions a CA acting as a CTS, who is able to verify the original certificate,
could issue a new certificate including the public key from the original certificate.
Another application of certificate translation is to translate a chain of certifi-
cates into a single certificate. This can in particular be useful in environments
where the CPU, memory, or bandwidth resources of the certificate recipient are
constrained, and can also be used to centralise trust and policy management in
a domain.
12.3 Security considerations
In this section security considerations that are introduced by translated certifi-
cates are described. Certificate content assurance (section 12.3.1), certificate
revocation (section 12.3.2), and liability (section 12.3.3) are all issues that need
to be considered.
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12.3.1 Certificate content assurance
A certificate translation service will in practice act as a CA. A CA usually
takes certain measures to ensure that the information it puts into a certificate
is correct. This typically includes measures to ensure that a claimed identity
actually belongs to the claimant and that an entity that supplies a public key to
be included in a certificate is also in possession of the corresponding private key.
The effort a CA puts into ensuring the correctness of this information is usually
defined either implicitly or explicitly in a certification practice statement. A
certificate translation service would have to rely on measures taken by other CAs
for the purposes of verifying identity and validating public keys. The signature
on the certificate that is to be translated, as well as any intermediate certificates
required to form a certificate chain to a trusted root, have to be validated. A
certificate translation service would have to publish its own certification practice
statement specifying under what circumstances a translated certificate will be
produced.
12.3.2 Revocation
By translating a certificate the translator is in practice issuing a new certificate
and therefore acting as a CA. If the original certificate is revoked the translated
certificate should also be revoked. In certain environments and applications this
problem can be tackled through giving translated certificates a minimal validity
period. Where this is not possible, revocation must be dealt with in a proper
way, just as in any other PKI.
If clients are going to be able to validate the status of the original certificate
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even when only in possession of the translated version, enough information must
be provided in the translated certificate (or along with it) to validate it against
certificate revocation lists, or any other means used to advertise revocations
for certificates issued by the original CA. In the case where X.509 v3 [76] is
used in the translated certificate and the original certificate conforms to X.509
v1, v2, or v3, the issuer name and certificate serial number can be stored in
an extension of the translated certificate, in order to allow traceability of the
original certificate.
12.3.3 Liability
A certification authority may place limitations on the use of its certificates, in
order to control the risk that it assumes as a result of issuing certificates. For
instance, it may restrict the community of certificate users, the purpose for
which they may use its certificates, and/or the type and extent of damages that
it is prepared to make good in the event of a failure on its part, or that of its
end-entities. These matters can be defined in a certificate policy.
It is most likely that by translating a certificate any liabilities undertaken by
the original CA will no longer apply. For certain applications, or where the
certificate policy refers to the public key rather than to the certificate as such,
liabilities undertaken by the CA originally issuing a certificate might still apply.
If the translating service is prepared to do so, it can issue translated certificates
under similar policies as the original certificate was issued; otherwise it can issue
the certificate using a more appropriate policy for the situation.
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12.4 Applications for certificate translation
In this section we will describe some situations where certificate translation can
be used.
12.4.1 Translating between incompatible certificate types
Many types of certificate exist today. A few examples are: X.509 [76], X9.68 [2],
Open-PGP certificates [22], SPKI certificates [37], EMV certificates [38], and
WTLS certificates [113]. Applications designed to use one type of certificate
usually do not work very well with a different type of certificate. In some cases
certificates are very application-oriented and using a different type of certificate
does not make any sense. For other applications different types of certificates
are used for the same purpose, possibly in different domains. Under such cir-
cumstances translation of certificates from one format into another would allow
entities using different types of certificates to communicate using the advantages
of public-key cryptography and digital certificates.
12.4.2 Translating incompatible certificate fields
Although many PKIs make use of standard formats for certificates such as X.509
[76], this can still create problems since, as in the case of X.509, the standard
supports extension fields that are not defined within the standard. Two different
CAs can be issuing certificates carrying extensions with the same purpose but
with different names. It is also possible that different CAs are issuing certificates
carrying extensions with the same name and syntax but with different purposes.
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This interoperability issue is made significantly more serious if the proprietary
extensions are marked as critical. That is, if indications are made in the certifi-
cate that the verifier is obliged to process these extensions when verifying the
certificate. Otherwise ignoring unrecognised extensions is always an option for
the verifying party.
12.4.3 Delegating path validation
If a client does not have sufficient processing or networking resources to perform
path validation for each certificate it receives, path validation can be delegated
to a certificate translation server. The CTS validates the certificate chain and
issues a new certificate carrying the public key of the last certificate in the chain.
12.4.4 Centralised trust and policy management
For organisations requiring a centrally imposed policy and management func-
tion, it is unacceptable to allow a client to manage its own set of trusted roots,
or the policies that it accepts during path validation. A certificate translation
server can enforce policy decisions while performing path validation. After val-
idating a certificate chain the certificate translation server can, if appropriate,
issue a translated version of the last certificate in the chain, at the same time
imposing restrictions regulated through its policy.
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12.5 Scenarios
In this section we motivate the use of translated certificates by showing how the
concept can be used within WAP (section 12.5.1) and MeXE (section 12.5.2).
12.5.1 WAP
Need for certificate translation in WAP
WAP (Wireless Application Protocol) [112] is considered here as a possible
application for which certificate translation could prove to be of advantage.
In WTLS (Wireless Transport Layer Security) [113], the security protocol de-
signed for WAP, certificates are used for server authentication as well as for
client authentication when so requested. Digital certificates can also be used
in WAP for key agreement. The WAP specification specifies three supported
formats for certificates and allows additional certificate types to be added in the
future. The currently specified certificate types are X.509v3 [76], X9.68 [2], and
a WTLS certificate, which is a certificate optimised for size.
WAP is intended to be used in a wireless environment by handheld devices
with limited storage, processing resources and transmission bandwidth. Secu-
rity parameters are negotiated during the WTLS handshake. This negotiation
may also require transmission of certificates between server and client and vice
versa. When certificates are known in advance, no certificates need to be trans-
mitted between the two parties. When a certificate is transmitted the sender
indicates the type of certificate that it supplies. However, there is no way for the
receiving party to indicate which type of certificate it prefers or understands.
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It therefore appears that, in order to be compatible with this version of WTLS,
an implementation must be able to handle all three of the specified certificate
types. A certificate chain can be transmitted along with a certificate. In a cer-
tificate chain, all certificates must use algorithms appropriate for the negotiated
key exchange suite. E.g. if RSA has been selected, all certificates must carry
RSA keys signed using an RSA signature.
Certificate translation in WAP
Certificate translation could be used in WAP in order to minimise the processing
and storage requirements of certificates, as well as to provide compatibility
with types of certificates other than those defined within the current WTLS
specification.
When a WAP client receives a certificate with an unknown type, it can simply
forward it to a server that offers a certificate translation service. The certificate
translation server interprets the certificate, validates it, and rewrites it in a
format that the client has requested, putting its own signature on it. However,
WAP is designed to be used in an environment where large time delays exist,
and it is possible that a connection would time out during the time it takes for
the WAP client to establish a session with a server that offers the translation
service and has the certificate translated. This should not, however, lead to
any serious complications. The client can initiate a new WTLS session and,
during this handshake, indicate that it already has the server certificate. The
corresponding scenario where a WAP server does not understand the client
certificate type would work in the same manner.
Certificate translation could also be used to reduce the computational load on
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a handheld device with limited CPU resources. Every certificate that needs to
be verified requires some computing resources. Given that a certificate chain
can contain quite a few certificates and that the processing power on some
handheld devices will be very limited it may be desirable to let a CTS do the
computations required. By doing this, resource requirements will be shifted from
CPU resources (on the handheld device) to bandwidth requirements, assuming
that CPU resources at the CTS are not limited. The CTS would, after receiving
a certificate chain, verify the certificates and, if the chain terminates in a root
public key trusted by the CTS, create a new certificate. This new certificate
would, according to our definition, be a translation of the last certificate in the
chain. After receiving the translated certificate the user could store it for future
use, if applicable.
12.5.2 MExE
Need for certificate translation in MExE
MExE is another application where a certificate translation service could be
advantageous.
MExE (Mobile Station Application Execution Environment), as specified by
3GPP, provides a standardised execution environment for mobile stations (typ-
ically a mobile phone with a smart card). MExE specifies three security do-
mains [1]:
- MExE security operator domain (MExE executables authorised by the
HPLMN (Home Public Land Mobile Network) operator, i.e the operator
whose network the user has a subscription to).
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- MExE security manufacturer domain (MExE executables authorised by
the terminal manufacturer).
- MExE security third party domain (MExE executables authorised by
trusted third parties).
Untrusted MExE executables are not in a specific domain, and have very reduced
privileges. For each domain a root public key is installed in the MS (Mobile
Station). In order for an executable to run, it has to carry a signature that can
be validated using root public keys and digital certificates (certificate chains are
supported). An optional mechanism, involving storing a hash of the executable
along with its expiry date/time in a protected verified application list, is defined
to avoid the need for signature verification each time an executable is run.
The MExE specification [1] mentions WTLS certificates and X.509 certificates
but does not rule out other types of certificates.
Certificate translation in MExE
Just as for WAP, certificate translation can be used in MExE in order to min-
imise the processing and storage requirements for certificates as well as to pro-
vide compatibility with other types of certificates.
Since no certificate type is mandated for MExE it is possible that problems with
incompatible certificate types will arise. Certificate translation can, in a very
similar way as described for WAP, be used to overcome such obstacles.
The problem with recurrent signature validation of previously executed code
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has been taken care of through the verified application list as mentioned above.
However, multiple applets downloaded and executed from the same site are
likely to share the same certificate chain. A translated certificate can be used to
shorten such a certificate chain in order to preserve CPU and memory resources.
It is likely that an MS aware of multiple instances of signed code from the same
site could do such a verification even more efficiently in terms of CPU resources.
A certificate translation approach, however, could be more general, and would
not require the terminal to store any intermediate states or results, and therefore
would require less memory resources.
12.6 Extension to SCVP
The Simple Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP) is currently an IETF Inter-
net draft [85]. The protocol allows a client to oﬄoad certificate handling to a
server. The server can give a variety of information about a certificate, such
as whether or not a certificate is valid, a chain to a trusted certificate, and so
on. SCVP has many purposes, including simplifying client implementations and
allowing companies to centralise their trust and policy management.
SCVP allows a client to request the status of a certificate. This requires applica-
tions using the SCVP service to be aware of the protocol. Applications designed
before the finalisation of SCVP, or which for some other reason do not support
SCVP, will not be able to make use of the SCVP protocol. If a certificate trans-
lation server were used instead, standalone software able to communicate with
a CTS would be able to interact with existing software without any changes
to the certificate-using software. The certificate-using software would have to
load the CTS public key as a trusted root public key, and certificates signed by
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the CTS would therefore be verifiable. Such a solution would allow a company
to centralise their trust and policy management, requiring minimal changes to
existing systems.
Another advantage with a certificate translation solution over the current SCVP
protocol is that only a certificate would need to be stored by the client, as
opposed to SCVP where a certificate and associated status information need to
be stored by the client if required for future use.
Since many features of SCVP are potentially useful in a certificate translation
service, certificate translation could be implemented as an extension to, or in
combination with, SCVP.
12.7 Outline of a certificate translation protocol
In this section we will outline a protocol for certificate translation. The protocol
described is a standalone protocol in order to show how certificate translation
can be implemented. As described in section 12.6 the protocol could be in-
corporated into another protocol. However, for environments with restricted
bandwidth, having a dedicated protocol is likely to reduce unnecessary commu-
nication overhead.
This protocol uses a simple request response model. That is, a client creates
a single request and sends it to the server; the server creates a single response
and sends it to the client. The client is assumed to be in possession of a trusted
copy of the CTS public key prior to use of the protocol.
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Certificate translation is expected to be of particular importance in wireless
environments, where bandwidth is limited, and where clients have restricted
processing and memory resources. Hence, in order to keep the data sent over the
communication path to a minimum, the CTS can keep a database of its clients
and their preferences. This will minimise the information that is sent in every
translation request. The server can, for example, store the preferred certificate
type, client certificate, and possibly certain certificate field information that
might be specific to a client.
12.7.1 Request
A translation request is made up of the following information, of which some
will not always be required:
• client identification,
• original certificate (certificate to be translated),
• original certificate type,
• new certificate type,
• new certificate content,
• certificates for path validation,
• client certificate,
• client signature.
We now consider each of these information types in a little more detail.
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Client identification
Client identification is used to identify the client requesting translation. Identifi-
cation can be used for things such as accounting, locating the client’s certificate
(if not supplied in the request), or to find the client’s preferences in a database if
such a database exists. In environments where this information is not required,
such as in a protected private network where the translation service is available
to all connected users, and there is no need for the server to keep a user database
of any kind, this information can be omitted.
Original certificate
This is the certificate for which translation is requested. The complete certificate
or a certificate identifier must be supplied as part of a certificate translation
request.
Original certificate type
If known by the client, the type of the certificate that is submitted for translation
is indicated here. Since one purpose of the protocol is to enable clients not aware
of certain types of certificate to have certificates of those types translated into a
known type, it must be assumed that the client is not always aware of the type
of the certificate that is submitted for translation. The translation server should
therefore be able to analyse the supplied certificate and come to a conclusion
regarding the supplied certificate type. In environments where the translation
service will be used for the purpose of translating from certificate types unknown
to the client, the translation server could be configured to know which types of
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certificates its clients are aware and not aware of, and which types the client is
likely to be requesting translation for. The certificate type field is also, when
applicable, used to indicate the certificate encoding, such as BER [70] or PER
[71], if known by the client.
New certificate type
This field indicates the type of certificate, and encoding if applicable, that the
client expects to receive back from the translation server.
New certificate content
This part allows the client to describe any specific information that needs to
be included in the new certificate. The client can specify the content of any
fields it wishes to have included, or may only indicate which fields are to be
included in the new certificate and let the translation server get the information
from the translated certificate. Another approach would be for the client to
indicate the intended usage for the new certificate. The detailed specification of
this particular section requires further research so as to allow enough flexibility
without requiring too great an overhead.
Certificates for path verification
Many protocols utilising digital certificates let the communicating parties in-
clude a certificate chain when exchanging certificates, in order for the other
party to verify the certification path. If the client receives such a certificate
chain it can forward it to the translation server.
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Client certificate
When the server is not expected to already possess the requesting client’s public
key, or is not able to retrieve it by other means, the client should also supply
its digital certificate in the request in order to enable the server to verify the
signature.
Client signature
When the translation service need to be restricted to pre-registered clients only,
when the service is being charged for, or when clients need to be held accountable
for their translation requests for other reasons, the client signs the complete
request.
12.7.2 Response
The certificate translation response is sent back to the client in response to
its request. If the requested certificate translation fails the server returns an
error code indicating why the request has not been fulfilled. If the request
is processed successfully, a new translated certificate is returned to the client.
Since the certificate will carry the translation server’s signature, no further
message authentication will be required in many cases. However, on occasions
when the client who requested the translation will not be the end user, it is
possible that the client will not be able to verify the certificate signature, and
another signature would be required in the response to enable the recipient to
verify that the message originates from the certificate translation server and has
not been tampered with.
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12.8 Conclusions
We have described the concept of certificate translation and how it can be used
in a variety of scenarios. Not only can the concept prove useful to convert cer-
tificates of different types, but it could also be particularly useful in wireless
environments in order to preserve bandwidth, memory, and CPU resources. A
protocol for certificate translation can be implemented as a standalone proto-
col or as an extension to, or in combination with, existing certificate status
management protocols. SCVP is a good example of an existing protocol that
can be extended to incorporate certificate translation. In other environments a
standalone protocol is more appropriate to keep communications overhead to a
minimum.
Agents deployed in a wireless environment are believed to have access to very
limited resources, and are hence prevented from carrying several digital certifi-
cates, and may be exposed to applications requiring different types of certifi-
cates. Certificate translation therefore seems to be well suited for agents in a
wireless environment.
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In this chapter we summarise the main conclusions and original contributions
of this thesis, and give suggestions for future work in the area.
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13.1 Summary and conclusions
This thesis deals with security in multi-agent systems in general, and in partic-
ular as applied to mobile communication.
The security issues existing for open multi-agent systems have been identified.
The security issues are mainly related to agent execution and the fact that, since
agents are autonomous and need to act upon information received from various
entities, the trustworthiness of this information need to be guaranteed by the
system and verified by the agent. Security issues related to agent execution, and
the fact that agents are under the control of a (perhaps untrusted) executing
host, are particularly relevant to mobile agents.
The security issues for non-mobile agents can, at least in theory, to a great
extent be tackled through existing security technology and protocols. However,
issues related to trust and delegation in a large scale multi-agent system are
non-trivial to solve. Although a public key infrastructure is likely to be an
important part of the solution, agents need to be able to reason about, and make
decisions based on, various security parameters. Execution of agents (mobile as
well as non-mobile) on untrusted platforms is another factor introducing non-
trivial security concerns, in particular related to correct agent execution and
confidentiality of agent data.
There does not seem to be a single solution to the security problems introduced
by mobile agents unless trusted hardware is introduced, which is likely to prove
too expensive for most applications. The way forward appears to lie in a range
of mechanisms aimed at solving particular (smaller) problems. This could, for
example, include mechanisms that depend on agents executing on several hosts
193
13. Conclusions
rather than on only one host, mechanisms and protocols binding agent actions
to hosts, generation of various types of audit information that can be used in
case of disputes, and so on. Solutions to certain problems do exist, but for
mobile agents to be more widely adopted this is an area that requires further
research.
A security architecture, designed for deployment of agent technology in a mo-
bile communication environment, has been proposed in this thesis. The security
architecture allows modelling of interactions at all levels within a mobile com-
munication system. The model includes the involved parties at the highest level,
then a device structure, an agent execution environment, and finally, the struc-
ture of an agent. Basic security functionality addressing the security of agents,
agent platforms, and agent communication has been identified and high level
outlines of how these security features can be realised have also been given.
We have also shown how conventional security protocols can be used to provide
secure communication within an agent-based system. Data integrity, data ori-
gin authentication, entity authentication, non-repudiation, confidentiality, and
anonymity can all be provided for agent communications.
For mobile agents it is a non-trivial task to ensure that communication originat-
ing from the agent cannot be spoofed. Several techniques to limit the threats
posed to mobile agent communication exist. Nevertheless, mobile agents must
be deployed with great care if the authenticity of the communication is of im-
portance.
The FIPA agent communication specifications lack sufficient functionality to
provide secure communication. By using an existing message structure such as
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the Open PGP message format, communications security services can be added
to FIPA. We have considered where security services can be applied to agent
communication within the FIPA architecture, and described the information
exchange required between an agent and the ACC security services. Further
detailed analysis and specification is, however, required for a complete solution.
A pragmatic solution to undetachable signatures has been proposed, relying on
conventional signatures and public key certificates. Our solution has potential
practical advantages by comparison with the use of undetachable signatures,
and appears to offer a very similar set of security guarantees. When combined
with the use of signatures by the agent platform, this solution has the potential
to solve certain problems relating to transaction repudiation.
We have considered two different ways in which the deployment of multiple
agents can reduce the threat to trading mobile agents from potentially malicious
agent platforms. In the first approach multiple agents are equipped with ‘shares’
of the means to commit to a transaction. A method implementing this idea using
a threshold signature scheme was outlined. In the second approach a single
trusted host is employed to collect information from multiple agents on possible
transactions. This host then chooses the optimal transaction and commits to it.
The two approaches each have their own advantages. The first approach avoids
the need for a single trusted host. However, implementing the first approach
requires use of some potentially complex cryptographic signature functions. The
second approach is potentially less complex from a cryptographic perspective,
but does require a host which, if not completely trusted, is at least required
to act neutrally with respect to the set of merchants. Both approaches are of
potential practical importance in future mobile computing environments.
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Threshold signatures can be used in a mobile agent scenario to spread the risk
between several agents and thereby overcome the threats posed by individual
malicious hosts. A pragmatic alternative to threshold signatures has been pro-
posed. This alternative has potential practical advantages by comparison with
the use of threshold signatures, and appears to offer a very similar set of security
guarantees. Although the analysis was performed within the context of mobile
agents, it is possible that the scheme is competitive with threshold signature
schemes in other environments.
Undetachable signatures and threshold signatures are both concepts applicable
to mobile agents. By combining threshold signatures and undetachable signa-
tures, the concept of undetachable threshold signatures has been introduced.
Undetachable threshold signatures enable constrained signing power to be dis-
tributed across multiple agents, thus reducing the necessary trust in single agent
platforms even further, compared to only using threshold signatures or unde-
tachable signatures.
We have described the concept of certificate translation and how it can be used
for different purposes. Not only can the concept prove useful to convert between
certificates of different types, but it can also be particularly useful in wireless
environments in order to preserve bandwidth, memory, and CPU resources. A
protocol for certificate translation can be implemented as a standalone proto-
col or as an extension to, or in combination with, existing certificate status
management protocols. SCVP is a good candidate of an existing protocol that
can be extended to incorporate certificate translation. In other environments a
standalone protocol is more suitable to minimise communications overheads.
Agents deployed in a wireless environment are believed to have access to very
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limited resources, and are hence prevented from carrying several digital certifi-
cates, and may be exposed to applications requiring different types of certifi-
cates. Certificate translation therefore seems to be well suited for agents in a
wireless environment.
13.2 Suggestions for future work
Although security mechanisms and services used in today’s distributed systems
and computer platforms are also applicable to multi-agent systems, for agents
to fully live up to their potential and be able to represent humans for more
complex tasks, issues related to trust needs to be further studied. Building
trust, describing trust, and reasoning about trust are all issues that need to be
addressed, and that are currently the subject of ongoing research.
Mobile agents potentially have an important role to play in future communi-
cation systems. However, to be of real use beyond very trivial tasks, security
mechanisms are required. In this thesis we have proposed security mechanisms
useful for mobile agents, but there is still scope for much more research in this
area.
One related area not investigated in this thesis where research is ongoing is that
of using mobile agents for security purposes. Mobile agents can be deployed
to enhance the security of a network. Applications that have been suggested
include, intrusion detection, virus detection, and security management. Appli-
cations like these do, of course, require that mobile agents themselves do not
introduce unmanageable security threats. This is still an emerging area, but
appears to offer interesting possibilities.
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The FIPA specifications need to be further developed to include security func-
tionality. We have proposed one way forward, but further details are needed for
a complete specification. XML should also be fully evaluated for the purpose of
securing FIPA agent communication.
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